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In 2015, domestic and international creditors were bracing 
for a historic financial event as the United States territory 
Puerto Rico teetered on the brink of catastrophic default. After 
almost a decade of economic headwinds, substantial money-
borrowing, and poor fiscal management, Puerto Rico’s 
financial condition was quickly deteriorating. However, the 
island’s legal status as a territory made it impossible for the 
government to take advantage of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to 
renegotiate its debt with institutional investors. After the 
Supreme Court denied the island’s own attempt to construct a 
restructuring process, Congress finally stepped in and enacted 
the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic 
Stability Act in the summer of 2016. The Act, commonly 
referred to as PROMESA, creates a novel framework under 
which Puerto Rico can renegotiate its credit commitments and 
hopefully regain access to the credit market sometime in the 
future. In particular, PROMESA creates the Financial 
Oversight and Management Board (FOMB), which is an 
independent organization with oversight and approval 
authority over much of the Puerto Rico bankruptcy process.  
However, because PROMESA as a legislative act is new and 
untested, several interesting questions arise as to the law’s 
infrastructure around accountability of entities such as the 
FOMB. These questions are especially salient as Puerto Rico is 
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the first U.S. territory to become insolvent; therefore, how these 
bankruptcy proceedings unfold will serve as important 
precedent for other territories or municipalities that may find 
themselves bankrupt.  
This Note focuses on the FOMB and whether stakeholders, 
such as creditors or Puerto Rican citizens, can judicially 
challenge the fiscal decisions made by the FOMB throughout 
this restructuring process. While this Note ultimately 
concludes that stakeholders may not have a strong legal 
argument to reverse the FOMB’s financial determinations in 
court, it also proposes that stakeholders may be more 
successful in appealing to congressional representatives to 
ensure that their voices are heard and their interests are 
accounted for throughout these unprecedented proceedings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Until the mid-twentieth century, Puerto Rico’s economy 
was driven by agriculture.1 Boosted by advantageous federal 
tax credits, generous government funding, and cheap labor, 
Puerto Rico’s economy quickly modernized—manufacturers 
rushed to establish factories on the island and local tourism 
flourished.2 Yet over the last two decades, Puerto Rico’s 
economy has slipped into a prolonged recession.3 After 
Congress began repealing many of these beneficial tax 
policies, businesses relocated to more cost-effective locations 
and the island’s unemployment increased while tax revenue 
 
1 Puerto Rico: The Economy, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Puerto-Rico/The-economy [https://perma. 
cc/JDQ5-Q9LT]. 
2 See id.; Nick Brown, How Dependence on Corporate Tax Breaks 
Corroded Puerto Rico’s Economy, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-puertorico-
economy/ [https://perma.cc/FM7E-VWLM]. 
3 Puerto Rico, supra note 1. 
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decreased.4 Puerto Rico began to rely heavily on borrowed 
money, and as of 2018, had accumulated over $120 billion in 
debt and pension obligations.5  
In June 2016, the U.S. Congress enacted the Puerto Rico 
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act 
(“PROMESA”).6 The enactment of PROMESA created a 
unique set of bankruptcy procedures that would allow Puerto 
Rico and its territorial instrumentalities7 to restructure debt 
commitments and eventually reestablish access to capital 
markets.8 PROMESA also established the Financial 
Oversight and Management Board (“FOMB”), which 
supervises the island’s financial rehabilitation.9 In particular, 
the FOMB has approval authority over the island’s various 
financial plans, legislative actions, and governance reforms.10  
The cornerstone of the PROMESA framework is a multi-
year “fiscal plan” that outlines a long-term approach to 
eliminating the island’s deficits and to implementing reforms 
 
4 Brown, supra note 2. 
5 FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. FOR P.R., NEW FISCAL PLAN FOR PUERTO 
RICO: RESTORING GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 1 (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1X3JdAwbfo47oZ__6_1aABcmfyzhPFrjE/vie
w [https://perma.cc/S4QS-2AXT] [hereinafter APR. 2018 FISCAL PLAN]. 
6 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 
Pub. L. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 48 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PROMESA]; D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R44532, THE PUERTO RICO OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND 
ECONOMIC STABILITY ACT 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44532.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5FDW-EJJS]. 
7 See PROMESA § 5(19)(A) (defining “territorial instrumentality” as 
“any political subdivision, public agency, instrumentality . . . or public 
corporation.”). 
8 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON NAT. RES., 114TH CONG., REP. ON H.R. 5278 
“PUERTO RICO OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMNT [sic], ECONOMIC STABILITY ACT” 
(PROMESA) SECTION BY SECTION 11–14 [hereinafter COMM. REPORT ON H.R. 
5278], https://republicans-naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/section 
_by_section_6.6.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GH7-Y3SZ]. 
9 See AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 3. 
10 See, e.g., PROMESA § 104 (summarizing many of the FOMB’s 
procedural powers); id. § 201 (detailing the FOMB’s responsibility over 
fiscal plans). 
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that will repair its struggling economy.11 More importantly, 
the fiscal plan serves as the FOMB’s chief enforcement tool to 
ensure that the government’s future spending practices, 
legislative activities, and debt restructuring efforts adhere to 
a broader recovery strategy.12  
However, Puerto Rico’s debt crisis is remarkably 
complex—the priority of creditors is unclear,13 and territorial 
bankruptcies have no legal precedent in the United States.14 
Consequently, attempts to devise a fiscal plan that is 
mutually agreeable to all classes of creditors, local 
government actors, and Puerto Rican residents have been 
fraught with conflict.15 There exists a fundamental tension 
between honoring the island’s contractual obligations and 
serving the needs of the island, especially under strained 
financial conditions. Specifically, creditors have voiced 
concerns that the fiscal plans are fundamentally flawed and 
that the overall drafting process lacks transparency.16 Certain 
 
11 See APR. 2018 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 5, at 1 (“[The Fiscal Plan] 
provides a blueprint of the structural reforms and fiscal measures that, if 
implemented, will give Puerto Ricans what they need and deserve—a 
growing economy with more and better jobs, a twenty-first century 
electricity grid, resilient infrastructure, and an effective and efficient public 
sector.”). 
12 COMM. REPORT ON H.R. 5278, supra note 8, at 8, 13–18 (summarizing 
the function of the fiscal plan, including which PROMESA provisions 
require consistency with the fiscal plan). 
13 See Emma Orr & Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico Bondholders Deny 
Legitimacy of Each Other’s Debt, BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-23/puerto-rico-
bondholders-say-everybody-and-nobody-has-valid-claim 
[https://perma.cc/W4LM-N9QT]; see also infra Section II.E. 
14 See Jaime Farrant, 4 Reasons Why Puerto Rico’s ‘Bankruptcy’ Process 
Matters to U.S. Residents, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2017), https:// 
www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/4-reasons-why-puerto-rico-s-bankruptcy-
process-matters-u-n766991 [https://perma.cc/Q8CH-BKGE]. 
15 See infra Section II.D. 
16 See Daniel Bases, Creditors Cry Foul on Puerto Rico’s Latest Fiscal 
Plan, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
puertorico-creditors/creditors-cry-foul-on-puerto-ricos-latest-fiscal-plan-
idUSKCN1FZ03W?il=0 [https://perma.cc/R5BD-PPXR]; Press Release, 
Assured Guar., Assured Guaranty Urges Puerto Rico Oversight Board to 
Reconsider Unlawful Fiscal Plan (May 15, 2018), 
  
372 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
parties have also brought legal challenges claiming that fiscal 
plans certified by the FOMB violate provisions within 
PROMESA as well as protections within the U.S. 
Constitution.17  
These debates highlight important normative questions 
regarding the scope of the FOMB’s authority under 
PROMESA—how much power should a select group of 
unelected individuals18 be given under this framework, and 
what, if any, avenues of review should be available to check 
the FOMB’s various governance decisions?19 Such issues have 
also become increasingly salient over the past two years. First, 
there have been many disagreements between the FOMB and 
Governor Ricardo Rosselló as each side struggles to assert a 
particular vision of the island’s fiscal and operational affairs.20 
 
http://assuredguaranty.com/assured-guaranty-urges-puerto-rico-oversight-
board-to-reconsider-unlawful-f [https://perma.cc/9Z9M-KH97]; Press 
Release, Grp. of P.R.’s Creditors, Puerto Rico’s Creditors Unite to Call for a 
Credible, Pro-Growth Fiscal Plan (Feb 14, 2018) [hereinafter Creditor Press 
Release], https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/puerto-ricos-
creditors-unite-to-call-for-a-credible-pro-growth-fiscal-plan-
300598668.html [https://perma.cc/YC6C-YPJE].  
17 See infra Part IV.  
18 The FOMB is composed of seven presidentially appointed members. 
PROMESA § 101(e)(1)(A), 48 U.S.C. § 2121(e)(1)(A) (2012). For more 
background on PROMESA and the FOMB, see infra Section II.C. 
19 See Ramon Rosario, Opinion, Puerto Rico Federal Oversight Board 
Has Power Hungry Intentions, HILL (Nov. 16, 2017), http://thehill.com/ 
opinion/energy-environment/360700-puerto-rico-federal-oversight-board-
has-power-hungry-intentions [https://perma.cc/2P9A-XT8R]. 
20 For example, at the end of 2017, the FOMB attempted to install its 
own emergency manager to head the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority 
(“PREPA”) after it was revealed the instrumentality had entered into a 
suspicious $300 million contract with a seemingly unqualified company, 
Whitefish Energy Holdings, for restoration of power and energy across the 
island. Steven Church, Rebecca Spalding & Michelle Kaske, Who’s in 
Charge of Puerto Rico? A Manhattan Judge Gets to Decide, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-13/who-
s-in-charge-of-puerto-rico-a-manhattan-judge-gets-to-decide 
[https://perma.cc/J7BT-LDHB]. In response, the governor of Puerto Rico 
filed suit against the FOMB, arguing that allowing such an action would set 
a dangerous precedent and give the FOMB authority to displace other 
elected officials. See id. The FOMB responded that Congress had granted it 
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Second, economic data currently suggests that Puerto Rico’s 
financial problems are not isolated, as other U.S. territories 
have also begun to feel the pressure of economic stagnation 
and unmanageable debt obligations.21 Hurricane Irma and 
 
broad powers to do everything necessary to repair the island’s finances, 
which in this case includes nominating a new leader of PREPA. See id.  
  Ultimately, the judge overseeing this PROMESA case rejected the 
FOMB’s nomination request. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 583 
B.R. 626, 632–33 (D.P.R. 2017) (“The FOMB’s authority to withhold 
approval and to make recommendations clearly gives it significant leverage 
to guide . . . the Commonwealth entities . . . . But nothing in the fiscal plan, 
budgeting, and enforcement provisions of PROMESA . . . suggests that the 
FOMB is the principal body empowered to manage PREPA’s day-to-day 
functions, or that it has direct authority to alter PREPA’s reporting 
structure and install a [chief transformation officer].”).  
  More recently, the FOMB and the governor also clashed on the April 
2018 fiscal plan, which initially required pension cuts and labor reforms. 
Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Board Approves Fiscal Plan as Governor Vows 
Defiance, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
puertorico-debt-fiscal/puerto-rico-board-approves-fiscal-plan-as-governor-
vows-defiance-idUSKBN1HQ2TG [https://perma.cc/2ECJ-YX2L]. Local 
lawmakers were unwilling to enact these changes and insisted that the 
FOMB lacked the authority to require such legislation. See id. The two sides 
eventually negotiated a compromise, and, in October 2018, the FOMB 
updated the fiscal plan to reflect these changes. See infra Section II.D. 
21 The U.S. Virgin Islands currently owes approximately $7 billion in 
bond and pension debt and millions in unpaid health benefits to retired 
employees. Marc Joffe, Hurricane Irma Could Tip US Virgin Islands into 
Bankruptcy, FISCAL TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/ 
2017/09/14/Hurricane-Irma-Could-Tip-US-Virgin-Islands-Bankruptcy 
[https://perma.cc/BRB7-8P3H]. As a result, credit rating agencies lowered 
their ratings of Virgin Island bond offerings. Id.  
  Similarly, the Northern Mariana Islands have an almost exhausted 
public pension system, and previously declared bankruptcy in 2012, 
although the case was dismissed. Mary Williams Walsh, After Puerto Rico’s 
Debt Crisis, Worries Shift to Virgin Islands, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/25/business/dealbook/virgin-islands-
debt-payment-pensions.html (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review). American Samoa recently lost one of its biggest economic drivers 
when a local business closed operations after the company was required to 
match federal minimum wage standards, and even Guam, which heavily 
benefits from large American military establishments on the island, has 
become concerned about its own debt after Puerto Rico’s default. Id.; see also 
Robert Slavin, Virgin Island Bonds Stir Concern, BOND BUYER (Dec. 28, 
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Hurricane Maria have only exacerbated the financial stress 
on these territories.22 These storms not only destroyed roads, 
homes, and infrastructure, but also left many inhabitants 
without food, water, and power.23 Rebuilding Puerto Rico 
requires significant financial investment,24 and the region’s 
local economies, including tourism, are recovering slowly.25 
Hence, the resolution of Puerto Rico’s debt crisis through the 
mechanisms provided by PROMESA will serve not only as an 
important paradigm for the market but will also set an 
important legal precedent for future territorial insolvencies.26 
This Note explores some of the growing legal and practical 
concerns at the heart of Puerto Rico’s unprecedented debt 
crisis, and especially focuses on several issues of first 
impression for courts interpreting and implementing 
PROMESA.27 Part II provides an overview of Puerto Rico’s 
 
2017), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/concern-about-virgin-island-
bonds-grow?tag=0000015b-2691-d5f6-a9df-e7b5ae090000 (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
22 Stephanie Rosenbloom, After Irma: Caribbean Tourism, Island by 
Island, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/09/15/travel/after-irma-caribbean-tourism-island-by-island.html (on 
file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
23 Id. 
24 Estimates indicate that Hurricane Maria created anywhere from $80 
billion to $139 billion worth of damage. See APR. 2018 FISCAL PLAN, supra 
note 5, at 2; Jessica Resnick-Ault & Nick Brown, Exclusive: Puerto Rico 




25 See Colleen Long, Puerto Rico Tourism Craters in Wake of Hurricane 
Maria, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
lifestyles/travel/ct-puerto-rico-tourism-hurricane-maria-20171024-
story.html [https://perma.cc/3HK8-LVPJ]; Resnick-Ault & Brown, supra 
note 24 (citing Puerto Rico governor’s characterization that Puerto Rico’s 
recovery from Hurricane Maria has been a “mixed bag.”). 
26 See generally Ike Brannon, What We Do in Puerto Rico Sets a 
Precedent, Like It or Not, HILL (May 5, 2016), http://thehill.com/ 
blogs/pundits-blog/economy-budget/278804-what-we-do-in-puerto-rico-sets-
a-precedent-like-it-or-not [https://perma.cc/42JF-8NM7]. 
27 Like many bankruptcies, Puerto Rico’s insolvency is complicated and 
messy. As a result, there are constantly new updates on almost every front 
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fiscal situation and describes Congress’s attempt to address 
the problem through a new legislative framework. Part II also 
describes ongoing attempts to finalize a fiscal plan that is 
agreeable to all major stakeholders, and highlights some of 
the concerns related to these efforts. Part III then describes 
one legal challenge creditors have tried to bring to invalidate 
fiscal plan proposals that appear inconsistent with the 
statutory requirements provided in PROMESA. Relatedly, 
Part III focuses on an important threshold question as to 
whether the FOMB’s approval of fiscal plans is judicially 
reviewable by a federal court. Part IV subsequently considers 
a second claim that stakeholders may bring in court, which is 
a due process challenge against the FOMB’s fiscal plan 
certification process. This argument is especially important if 
the substance of the plan may not be judicially reviewable as 
discussed in Part III. Finally, Part V discusses the role that 
Congress can play in observing these proceedings and 
ensuring that the FOMB is acting effectively. Specifically, this 
Note argues that while action under PROMESA and other 
legal theories in court may not provide stakeholders with 
satisfactory recourse to challenge the actions of the FOMB, 
there are strong incentives for institutional actors, such as 
Congress, to promote more transparency and collaboration 
throughout this entire process. The ultimate goal of helping 
Puerto Rico regain access to debt markets is a critical long-
term interest of the island, and much of it is inevitably 
dependent upon creditor confidence. 
II. PUERTO RICO’S DEBT CRISIS AND PROMESA 
This Part provides an overview of Puerto Rico’s current 
debt crisis and Congress’s subsequent legislative response. 
Section II.A details the confluence of factors that contributed 
to the island’s extensive debt problem. Section II.B describes 
Puerto Rico’s initial legislative solution to its financial 
situation and explains the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
 
of the restructuring process and ongoing litigation. This Note focuses on 
events up until February 2019, and attempts to present the most current 
information up until that point in time.  
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decision striking down the law as unconstitutional. Section 
II.C discusses the political backdrop that led to Congress’s 
enactment of PROMESA and lays out the law’s central 
provisions. Section II.D details ongoing efforts to develop a 
suitable fiscal plan, and finally, Section II.E summarizes some 
of the broader challenges that underlie the fiscal plan drafting 
and certification process.  
A. Origins of Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis  
As of 2018, Puerto Rico has accumulated over $120 billion 
in liabilities consisting of approximately $70 billion in debt 
and about $50 billion in unfunded pension obligations.28 The 
cause of this indebtedness can be attributed to factors such as 
federal rollback of critical fiscal policies and poor local 
budgetary governance.29 This Section describes the various 
circumstances that contributed to Puerto Rico’s initial 
economic growth, and then details how the repeal of certain 
fiscal policies precipitated Puerto Rico’s economic nosedive 
and led to the island’s debilitating dependence on borrowed 
money.  
Several decades ago, the U.S. federal government sought 
to transform Puerto Rico’s largely agrarian economy into a 
hub for manufacturing.30 Congress developed “Operation 
Bootstrap,” a system of economic incentives aimed at 
attracting U.S. manufacturing companies to the island.31 The 
federal government also implemented favorable income tax 
 
28  FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. FOR P.R., NEW FISCAL PLAN FOR PUERTO 
RICO: RESTORING GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 7 (Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/17ca0ALe7vpYn0jEzTz3RfykpsFSM0ujK/vie
w [https://perma.cc/3UGQ-ALGB] [hereinafter OCT. 2018 FISCAL PLAN].  
29 AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 30. See generally D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R44095, PUERTO RICO’S CURRENT FISCAL CHALLENGES 
(2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44095.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8FW-
WLAV]. 
30 See John W. Schoen, Here’s How an Obscure Tax Change Sank Puerto 
Rico’s Economy, CNBC (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/26/ 
heres-how-an-obscure-tax-change-sank-puerto-ricos-economy.html 
[https://perma.cc/5JE5-VVE7].  
31 See Brown, supra note 2.  
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policies that provided exemptions on corporate profits32 and 
authorized Puerto Rico to issue “triple tax exempt” bonds 
which did not require investors to pay federal, state, or local 
taxes on interests earned from these debt instruments.33 
Many of these debt offerings were also backed by strong 
statutory and constitutional guarantees, thus making them 
attractive and seemingly “risk-free” investments.34 
Consequently, local businesses, such as pharmaceutical and 
life science companies, prospered and contributed substantial 
tax revenue to the island.35 
While these policies were effective at propping up the 
island’s growing industries, tax reformers criticized some of 
these benefits as “corporate welfare.”36 In 1996, Congress 
repealed the income tax exemptions and allowed the scheme 
to phase out over ten years.37 Unsurprisingly, these policy 
changes had significant ramifications for Puerto Rico’s 
economy—corporations and businesses quickly left the island 
and local unemployment rates sky-rocketed.38 This was 
subsequently followed by the Great Recession,39 during which 
 
32 See id.; see also Heather Long, Puerto Rico’s Crisis: How Did It Get 
So Bad?, CNNMONEY (May 12, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/ 
2016/05/12/investing/puerto-rico-debt-crisis/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/WF8S-2SLM]. 
33 48 U.S.C. § 745 (2012); see also Thomas Heath, To the Average 
Investor, Puerto Rico Debt Crash Is More Whimper, Less Bang, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-there/wp/2017/ 
10/10/to-the-average-investor-puerto-rico-debt-crash-is-more-whimper-
less-bang/?utm_term=.e90c7e159105 [https://perma.cc/S7X9-7D4P]. 
34 For more details on the structure of these debt guarantees, see infra 
Section II.E. 
35 See APR. 2018 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 5, at 6.  
36 Schoen, supra note 30. 
37 See Long, supra note 32. 
38 Around the time the exemptions phased out, Puerto Rico’s 
unemployment rate fell dramatically, and as of 2017, the unemployment 
rate was more than twice that of the U.S. national average unemployment 
rate. Nathan Bomey, 6 Reasons Why Puerto Rico Slid into Financial Crisis, 
CNBC (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/05/6-reasons-why-
puerto-rico-slid-into-financial-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/EXX2-FX5F]. 
39 Schoen, supra note 30. 
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unemployed workers, including valuable skilled laborers, 
began leaving the island in search of work on the mainland.40  
As a consequence of these headwinds, Puerto Rico has seen 
its gross national product shrink by twenty percent, its labor 
participation fall to a low of thirty-eight percent, and its local 
population decrease by ten percent.41 Puerto Rico’s tax base 
has shrunk dramatically, and in response, the island began 
taking advantage of its ability to issue safe and economically 
appealing bonds and borrowed significant funds to bridge 
these financing shortfalls.42 
However, this quickly drew the island into a dangerous 
“death spiral.”43 Poor tax policies and economic slowdown 
caused local businesses and workers to leave the island, which 
exacerbated the local tax revenue deficit. This forced an 
already distressed territory to assume more debt and 
simultaneously increase tax rates in an attempt to bridge the 
financing gap. These pressures drove more residents and local 
businesses to leave the island, thus perpetuating a downward 
cycle of economic deterioration.  
B. The Puerto Rico Recovery Act and the Supreme 
Court 
Recognizing the severity of Puerto Rico’s financial 
condition, local government leaders enacted a statute that 
attempted to provide the island with legal mechanisms to 
 
40 This exodus of workers led to a shrinking future workforce, as 
families with young children began leaving the island. See Long, supra note 
32; see also Patrick Gillespie, Puerto Rico’s Brain Drain: Fewer Children in 
Schools, CNNMONEY (Dec. 23, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/ 
2015/12/23/news/economy/puerto-rico-brain-drain/?iid=EL 
[https://perma.cc/6WTX-U9LK]. 
41 APR. 2018 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 5, at 7.  
42 Schoen, supra note 30. 
43 See Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and 
the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1160 n.28 
(2016) (citing to instances where courts have described depopulation and 
service inefficiency as a “death spiral” for distressed municipalities). 
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restructure its debt obligations.44 However, the Supreme 
Court ultimately found this law to be unconstitutional.45 
Section II.B.1 provides an overview of this piece of legislation 
and how it was intended to manage the island’s ballooning 
debt problem. Section II.B.2 summarizes the Supreme Court’s 
rationale in striking down this law and highlights the 
compounding circumstances that compelled Congress to enact 
PROMESA.  
1. The Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt 
Enforcement and Recovery Act  
As Puerto Rico’s local deficit grew and economic conditions 
worsened, credit rating agencies began downgrading the 
island’s public debt. This occurred several times between early 
2014 and mid-2015,46 and, as a result, investors began to lose 
confidence in Puerto Rico’s ability to repay its debt 
obligations.47 The island subsequently lost access to credit 
markets and this inability to continue borrowing money only 
further intensified the government’s financial difficulties.48 In 
the summer of 2014, Puerto Rican officials declared a state of 
fiscal emergency, and legislators responded by enacting the 
Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and 
Recovery Act (“Recovery Act”).49  
Because of Puerto Rico’s territorial status, local legislators 
expressed skepticism that the island would have access to 
federal Chapter 9 bankruptcy procedures designed for state 
 
44 Recent Legislation, Municipal Bankruptcy — Preemption — Puerto 
Rico Passes New Municipal Reorganization Act, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1320, 
1321–22 (2015) [hereinafter Municipal Bankruptcy]. 
45 See infra Section II.B.2.  
46 AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 4.  
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Then-Governor Alejandro García Padilla introduced the Recovery 
Act on June 25, 2014, and Puerto Rico’s Legislative Assembly immediately 
passed the law a few days later on June 28, 2014. Municipal Bankruptcy, 
supra note 44, at 1320–21. 
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municipalities.50 Similarly, the island’s public 
instrumentalities did not appear to fall under federal Chapter 
11 bankruptcy for corporations.51 Legislators constructed the 
Recovery Act to fill this legal gap—it gave the island “a 
controlled, orderly way to negotiate with creditors to lower 
debt,” and thus was aimed at protecting the interests of both 
the public and creditors.52 
2. Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free 
Trust and the Puerto Rico Debt Default 
A group of Puerto Rico bondholders quickly brought 
challenges to the new Recovery Act. These corporations 
claimed that the local law was explicitly preempted by the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, as states and territories are prohibited 
from creating independent insolvency schemes.53 The Puerto 
Rico government, however, believed the Recovery Act was an 
imperative piece of legislation for the island, as the federal 
bankruptcy code does not provide territories with access to 
crucial insolvency and restructuring processes.54  
 
50 GOV’T DEV. BANK FOR P.R., THE FACTS ABOUT PUERTO RICO’S PUBLIC 
CORPORATIONS: DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT [hereinafter PUERTO 
RICO’S PUBLIC CORPORATIONS], http://www.bgfpr.com/documents/ 
FactsAboutDebtEnforcementAndRecoveryAct.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z2A-
PYEE]; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012) (defining “municipality” as a 
“political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State”); id. 
§ 101(52) (excluding the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico from the 
definition of “state” for purposes of defining who may be a debtor under 
Chapter 9); id. § 109(c)(1) (“An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 . . . 
if and only if such entity . . . is a municipality”). 
51 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (defining “corporation” as including private 
corporations, joint-stock companies, business trusts, etc.); id. § 101(41) 
(defining “person” to include an individual, partnership, and corporation); 
id. § 109(d) (stating that a “person” that may be a debtor under Chapter 7 
may also be a debtor under Chapter 11). 
52 PUERTO RICO’S PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, supra note 50. 
53 See generally Brief for Franklin Respondents at 7–12, Puerto Rico v. 
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (No. 15-233). 
54 See Brief for Petitioners at 11, Franklin Cal., 136 S. Ct. 1938 (No. 15-
233); see also PUERTO RICO’S PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, supra note 50. 
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During appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit55 and eventually the Supreme Court,56 
Puerto Rico began to default on its debt obligations.57 In 
August 2015, the territory failed to pay $58 million due to 
creditors of its Public Finance Corporation.58 Puerto Rico then 
defaulted on $1 billion in debt payments in January 201659 
and on $422 million in debt payments due in May of the same 
year.60  
In June 2016, the Supreme Court announced its two-part 
decision in the case Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. 
Puerto Rico,61 and held that: (1) while Puerto Rico is not a 
“State” under the Bankruptcy Code’s provision governing who 
qualifies as a debtor seeking relief under Chapter 9, (2) Puerto 
Rico is a “State” under the section’s preemption provision, 
meaning that the federal Bankruptcy Code did in fact preempt 
the Recovery Act.62 Section 101(52) of the Bankruptcy Code 
provides that the definition of a “State” shall include “the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of 
 
55 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 
2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). 
56 Franklin Cal., 136 S. Ct. 1938. 
57 The First Circuit announced its decision regarding the Recovery Act 
in July 2015, and the petition for review by the Supreme Court was 
submitted in August 2015, the same month of the island’s first default 
event. See Franklin Cal., 805 F.3d at 322; see also Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, Franklin Cal., 136 S. Ct. 1938 (No. 15-233). 
58 This debt was owned not by institutional investors but by ordinary 
Puerto Ricans through credit unions. Patrick Gillespie, Puerto Rico Just 
Defaulted for the First Time, CNNMONEY (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/03/investing/puerto-rico-default/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/EG25-TN49]. 
59 Heather Long, Puerto Rico Will Default AGAIN, CNNMONEY (Dec. 
30, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/30/investing/puerto-rico-default-
january/?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/H4YG-JAEV]. 
60 Heather Long, Puerto Rico Defaults on $422 Million, CNNMONEY 
(May 2, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/02/investing/puerto-rico-
default-may-1/?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/7BBW-D7FD]. 
61 The Court affirmed by a 5-2 vote, with Justice Samuel Alito recusing 
himself, and Justice Antonin Scalia’s seat being vacant at the time of the 
decision. Franklin Cal., 136 S. Ct. at 1941. 
62 Id. at 1946, 1949.  
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defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”63 
By “[focusing] on the plain wording of the clause,” the majority 
determined that Puerto Rico was unambiguously prohibited 
from initiating municipal bankruptcy proceedings under 
Chapter 9.64 However, the Court also held that the exclusion 
in section 101(52) did not extend to other provisions of 
Chapter 9 and thus, the Code’s preemption provision still 
applied to Puerto Rico.65 So not only was the island precluded 
from initiating traditional municipal bankruptcy, but it was 
also prohibited from enacting independent procedures 
through targeted legislation such as the Recovery Act. 
C. The Congressional Solution: PROMESA 
After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Franklin California, 
Puerto Rico was back where it had started—the territory was 
still buried under billions of dollars in unpayable debt but had 
no viable path towards solvency. The island was nearing its 
fourth default, this time under unprecedented circumstances: 
the island’s constitutionally-guaranteed general obligation 
(“GO”) bonds were due to mature in July.66  
While Puerto Rico had previously defaulted several times, 
this particular instance was unique because GO bonds are 
typically considered the “crème de la crème of the bond world” 
and “[p]ayment is generally guaranteed.”67 This particular 
 
63 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012) (emphasis added). 
64 Franklin Cal., 136 S. Ct. at 1946. For the Bankruptcy Code’s 
“gateway provision,” see 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (“An entity may be a debtor 
under chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity (1) is a municipality; 
[and] (2) is specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor under such chapter by 
State law[.]”), which outlines eligibility to file for municipal bankruptcy. 
65 See 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (“This chapter does not limit or impair the 
power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality . . . 
[except if] a State law prescribe[es] a method of composition of indebtedness 
of such municipality[.]”) (emphasis added). 
66 Heather Long, Puerto Rico Makes Historic Default, CNNMONEY (July 
1, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/01/investing/puerto-rico-defaults-
general-obligation-bonds/index.html [https://perma.cc/93N4-AXXV]. 
67 Heather Long, President Obama Signs Puerto Rico Rescue Bill, 
CNNMONEY (June 30, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/29/investing/ 
puerto-rico-debt-promesa/index.html [https://perma.cc/YJ97-9RGJ]. For 
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default would be the first instance since the Great Depression 
that a state or territory would default and fail to satisfy its 
GO obligations.68 Not only would “the anticipated missed 
payments likely [have] roiled credit markets and sparked 
creditor lawsuits,”69 but the island was already on the edge of 
becoming a humanitarian crisis.70 In light of these concerns, 
Congress had to act fast.  
Prior to the enactment of PROMESA, members of the 
House and Senate introduced several bills that sought to 
provide the territory with a legally viable solution. In March 
2015, Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi—Puerto Rico’s 
non-voting member of the U.S. House of Representatives71—
introduced amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would 
grant Puerto Rico full access to Chapter 9.72 Several months 
later, lawmakers introduced legislation that would establish 
 
more details on the complex nature of Puerto Rico’s debt structure, see infra 
Section II.E. 
68 Long, supra note 66. 
69 Mike DeBonis & Steven Mufson, Puerto Rico Rescue Bill Clears 




70 See Vann R. Newkirk II, Will Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis Spark a 
Humanitarian Disaster?, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2016), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/puerto-rico-treasury-visit/482562/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y5DK-BGL5]. For example, lack of financial resources on 
the island led to local schools having “termite-riddled walls, tenuous 
electricity, and pools of standing water––perfect places for the mosquitoes 
that spread Zika to hide.” Id. 
71 The post of Resident Commissioner within the House of 
Representatives was created by Congress in 1900. Member FAQs, OFF. OF 
THE CLERK, http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/memberfaq.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7GM8-KZC3]. The Resident Commissioner serves for a 
four-year term and has most of the same authorities as a traditional House 
member. Id. For instance, the Resident Commissioner can serve on House 
Committees and can speak, introduce bills, and offer amendments on the 
House floor. Id. However, the Resident Commissioner does not have 
legislative voting power. Id.  
72 AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 29 tbl.A-1. A similar measure was 
introduced in the Senate a few months later. Id. 
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a local fiscal oversight entity and a stay on Puerto Rico debt-
related litigation until April 1, 2016.73 
The final draft of PROMESA incorporated many of these 
ideas.74 Likely prompted by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Franklin California and a recognition that Puerto Rico’s 
upcoming July 1 GO default would have profound 
ramifications for the island and credit markets, the House and 
Senate successfully passed H.R. 5278 and S. 2328 respectively 
in June 2016.75 A day later, President Obama signed 
PROMESA into law.76 
Congress enacted PROMESA with the hope of returning 
the territory to solvency and restoring the island’s access to 
credit markets.77 Recognizing that insufficient governance 
and fiscal transparency partly caused the debt crisis,78 
Congress created the FOMB, an oversight entity with a broad 
mandate and strong statutory powers.79 While Congress put 
 
73 Id. 
74 H.R. 5278, 114th Cong. (2016); S. 2328, 114th Cong. (2016). These 
bills were the second iteration of PROMESA and were a revised version of 
a previous bill that Representative Sean Duffy introduced a month prior. 
See AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 29 tbl.A-1. For a review of the differences 
between prior and final versions of the PROMSA bill, see id. at 1. 
75 The House passed the H.R. 5278 by a vote of 297–127, and the Senate 
approved amended S. 2328 by a 68–30 vote. AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 1.  
76 Long, supra note 67. 
77 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON NAT. RES., 114TH CONG., H.R. 5278: “PUERTO 
RICO OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC STABILITY ACT (PROMESA)” 
[hereinafter PROMESA COMM. SUMMARY], https://naturalresources. 
house.gov/uploadedfiles/promesa_packet_6.6.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWZ4-
4ZTU]. 
78 H.R. REP. NO. 114-602, at 41 (2016). 
79 The FOMB is composed of seven presidentially appointed members 
who each have expertise in an area such as municipal bond markets, 
management, law, and business and government, but who are not officials 
or employees of any relevant territorial government. PROMESA §§ 
101(e)(1)(A), 101(f), 48 U.S.C. §§ 2121(e)(1)(A), 2121(f) (2012). While leaders 
in Congress are responsible for the initial submission of names, the 
President makes the official appointments based on bipartisan 
recommendations to fill the board. Id. § 101(e)(2). 
At the end of 2017, Aurelius Capital Management, a hedge fund, 
brought a legal challenge against the constitutionality of the FOMB. Tom 
Hals, Aurelius Hedge Fund Seeks to Toss Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy Filing, 
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the FOMB in place to guarantee that “Puerto Rico remedies 
its finances,” the FOMB was also tasked with ensuring 
“fairness” to creditors and debtors in the reorganization 
process.80  
The FOMB has powers over various areas and activities 
under PROMESA. For example, it may hold hearings and seek 
testimony, request information from creditors involved in 
PROMESA proceedings, issue subpoenas, enter into 
contracts, and enforce public employment laws.81 The FOMB 
is backed by the power of the judicial system to enforce “its 
authority to carry out its responsibilities,” and has recourse to 
criminal and administrative disciplinary actions if an 
 
REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-
debt-bankruptcy/aurelius-hedge-fund-seeks-to-toss-puerto-ricos-
bankruptcy-filing-idUSKBN1AN27H [https://perma.cc/F9RJ-LEAC]. In 
particular, Aurelius argues that the creation of the FOMB violated the U.S. 
Constitution’s Appointments Clause, as the appointed members were never 
confirmed by the Senate. Id. Aurelius also argues that while the FOMB only 
answers to the President, six of the seven members were hand-picked and 
nominated by Congress, which violates the basic principle of separation of 
powers. Id. 
The FOMB contends, however, that the Appointments Clause does not 
apply when Congress is creating territorial offices under Article IV of the 
U.S. Constitution, as the federal government can exercise “plenary 
authority to structure territorial governments unconstrained by separation-
of-powers principles[.]” Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Title III 
Petition at 1, In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 583 B.R. 626 (D.P.R. 
2017) (No. 17 BK 3283). 
In December 2018, the First Circuit heard oral argument in an appeal 
of the lower court’s decision that the FOMB did not violate the 
Appointments Clause. See Eva Lloréns Vélez, Swain’s World: A Repeal of 
PROMESA Would Raise Concerns About Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Future, 
CARIBBEAN BUS. (Dec. 6, 2018), https://caribbeanbusiness.com/swains-world-
a-repeal-of-promesa-would-raise-concerns-over-puerto-ricos-fiscal-future/ 
[https://perma.cc/V33E-HYR9].  
In February 2019, the First Circuit overturned the lower court’s 
decision and held that members of the FOMB were in fact subject to the 
Appointments Clause. See generally Aurelius Inv., LLC v. Puerto Rico, No. 
18-1671, 2019 WL 642328 (1st Cir. Feb. 15, 2019). Despite this conclusion, 
the court refused to dismiss all pending Title III petitions as Aurelius had 
requested. Id. at *16.  
80 PROMESA COMM. SUMMARY, supra note 77, at 7.  
81 See PROMESA § 104. 
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individual provides false information or refuses an order by 
the FOMB.82 
The FOMB also has the “sole discretion,” in many 
instances, to review, approve, and officially certify various 
plans or actions of the local government.83 The key governing 
document under PROMESA is the fiscal plan, which covers a 
multi-year time horizon.84 Before approval, the FOMB must 
determine if the plan “provide[s] a method to achieve fiscal 
responsibility and access to the capital markets” by analyzing 
whether it satisfies a list of fourteen requirements.85 After this 
analysis has been completed, the FOMB shall issue a 
“compliance certification” to the local governor and the 
legislature.86 
The FOMB plays a similar role in approving annual 
budgets,87 debt readjustment plans, and other voluntary 
agreement plans relating to PROMESA’s Title III debt 
restructuring proceedings.88 It also has authority to 
substantively review all legislative enactments promulgated 
by the Puerto Rico governor or legislature.89 Within its review 
and approval powers, the FOMB is required to determine, 
among other things, whether the proposed plan or action is 
 
82 Id. 
83 See, e.g., id. § 201(c)(3) (“[I]f the oversight board determines in its 
sole discretion that the proposed Fiscal Plan . . . satisfies such requirements, 
the Oversight Board shall approve the proposed Fiscal Plan.”) (emphasis 
added). 
84 Id. § 201(b). These fiscal plans can be drafted at the highest level for 
the Commonwealth government or for lower territorial instrumentalities. 
Id. 
85 Id. § 201(b)(1); see also infra note 95.  
86 Id. § 201(e).  
87 Id. § 202(a)–(b). 
88 Id. § 104(i)–(j). For more information on Title III, see infra Section 
IV.A.  
89 Id. § 204. The governor is required to submit the law to the FOMB 
with a certification of its compliance with the fiscal plan. Id. § 204(a)(2). If 
the FOMB receives notification that a law is inconsistent with the plan, the 
FOMB is given power to “take such actions as it considers necessary, 
consistent with [PROMESA], to ensure that the enactment or enforcement 
of the law will not adversely affect the territorial government’s compliance 
with the Fiscal Plan[.]” Id. § 204(a)(5). 
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compliant with the provisions of the existing fiscal plan.90 
Under this framework, the fiscal plan serves as an important 
guide to inform future decisions and behaviors of not only the 
FOMB, but also the Commonwealth government and its 
instrumentalities. It also creates a tangible outline for 
creditors and institutional actors in subsequent bankruptcy 
proceedings.  
D. Evolution of the Commonwealth Fiscal Plan  
A PROMESA fiscal plan lays out projections, revenue 
enhancements, and expenditure reductions that are aimed at 
reforming the island’s financial condition.91 The plan analyzes 
how factors such as population and economic growth or 
contraction will impact current and future deficit levels.92  
Under section 201 of PROMESA, the FOMB and Puerto 
Rico governor are tasked with developing a schedule for 
drafting, revising, and approving fiscal plans.93 The governor 
shall then submit a proposed plan for consideration,94 and the 
FOMB must assess whether the proposal satisfies the 
statutory requirements of the plan as laid out by Congress.95 
 
90 See, e.g., id. § 202(c)(1) (“[T]he Oversight Board shall determine in 
its sole discretion whether each proposed Budget is compliant with the 
applicable Fiscal Plan.”). 
91 P.R. FISCAL AGENCY & FIN. ADVISORY AUTH., FISCAL PLAN FOR PUERTO 
RICO 5 (2017) [hereinafter MAR. 2017 FISCAL PLAN], https://junta 
supervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/50/58c71815e9d43.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2SV3-CQZV]. 
92 See generally id.; APR. 2018 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 5.  
93 PROMESA § 201(a). However, while the FOMB can consult with the 
governor in establishing a schedule, the FOMB “retain[s] sole discretion” to 
set or change dates “as it deems appropriate and reasonably feasible.” Id.  
94 Id. § 201(c)(2). 
95 See id. § 201(c)(3). Some of these requirements include: estimates of 
revenues and expenditures; ensured funding of essential public services and 
public pension systems; improvements of fiscal governance, accountability, 
and internal controls; fiscal targets; a debt sustainability analysis; 
information on capital expenditures and investments necessary to promote 
economic growth; assurance that assets, funds, or resources will not be 
improperly loaned to, transferred to, or otherwise used for the benefit of 
other purposes (unless permitted by the Puerto Rico constitution or in an 
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If necessary, the FOMB will work with the governor to revise 
or redraft the plan until it believes that the plan satisfies all 
of PROMESA’s requirements.96  
On October 14, 2016, the governor of Puerto Rico 
submitted a preliminary draft of a fiscal plan to the FOMB.97 
After a brief public comment period,98 the FOMB raised 
several substantive concerns about the plan. Over the course 
of the next several months, the FOMB and the governor 
worked together to modify and update many of the core 
assumptions, projections, and recommendations of the plan.99 
On March 13, 2017, the FOMB formally approved and 
certified a ten-year fiscal plan for the Commonwealth 
government.100  
This initial plan anticipated a budget deficit of $66.9 billion 
over ten years, $35.1 billion of which was allocated to debt 
payments.101 To address this projected deficit, the plan also 
recommended several measures that, if effectively 
 
approved plan of adjustment); and provisions that respect the relative 
lawful priorities or lawful liens, in the constitution, other laws, or 
agreements. Id. § 201(b)(1). 
96 See id. §§ 201(b)(1), 201(c)(3), 201(e). 
97 See generally COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO FISCAL PLAN (2016), 
https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/52/58210006a 
3536.pdf [https://perma.cc/443U-ULJF] [hereinafter PROPOSED 2016 FISCAL 
PLAN]. 
98 See infra Section IV.B.  
99 See, e.g., Letter from José B. Carrion III, Chair, Fin. Oversight & 
Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., to Alejandro García Padilla, Governor of P.R. (Nov. 23, 
2016), https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/50/583 
c7b9086b20.pdf [https://perma.cc/J52W-9UGN]; see also Letter from José B. 
Carrion III, Chair, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., to Alejandro García 
Padilla, Governor of P.R., & Ricardo Rosselló Nevares, Governor-Elect of 
P.R. (Dec. 20, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Fiscal Plan Adjustment Letter], 
https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/50/58598734 
087c1.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB9V-MSD7]. 
100 See FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. FOR P.R., BOARD RESOLUTION 
ADOPTED ON MAR. 13, 2017 (FISCAL PLAN CERTIFICATION) [hereinafter BOARD 
RESOLUTION], https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/50/ 
58f614484710d.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP69-QGEU]. See generally MAR. 
2017 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 91.  
101 MAR. 2017 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 91, at 8.  
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implemented, would limit expenses, maximize revenue, and 
ultimately offset the $66.9 billion.102 Some of these proposed 
changes included reforming aspects of the tax system103 and 
launching efforts to attract new employers and incentivize 
greater job participation.104 The fiscal plan also proposed 
several areas of financial governance reform, including 
increased transparency, centralized coordination of cash 
management, and mechanisms to reconcile revenue and 
expense figures.105  
The plan projected that, if such changes were effectively 
implemented, there would be a net surplus of $7.9 billion that 
could then be used to service the island’s various debt 
obligations.106 Given the magnitude of the outstanding debt, 
creditors would receive at most around twenty-four percent of 
their original investments.107 In other words, three-quarters 
of Puerto Rico’s current debt obligations would not be repaid 
under this plan. Such a recovery rate represented a massive 
loss to lenders.108 
A few months later in September 2017, Hurricane Irma 
swept through the Caribbean, cutting off power to two-thirds 
 
102 See id. at 8–9. 
103 These proposed reforms included improving tax collection and 
increasing tax rates on tobacco, as well as adjusting retirement benefits in 
the pension system. Id. at 18–23. 
104 Id. at 23. 
105 Id. at 33–37.  
106 Id. at 10. This surplus would be allocated to paying off debt 
obligations after the government had covered its other ordinary and 
necessary territorial expenses. Id. 
107 Alan Schankel, Puerto Rico Update: Time Is on No One’s Side, 
JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT LLC, Mar. 22, 2017, https://www.janney.com/ 
File%20Library/Fixed%20Income/PR-Update-March-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6U57-BVYW]. 
108 See Juan González, Puerto Rico’s $123 Billion Bankruptcy Is the 
Cost of U.S. Colonialism, INTERCEPT (May 9, 2017), https://theintercept.com/ 
2017/05/09/puerto-ricos-123-billion-bankruptcy-is-the-cost-of-u-s-
colonialism/ [https://perma.cc/M3J4-BS8S] (describing this recovery rate as 
“not just a haircut for bondholders [but] a head-shaving, one that will send 
shock waves throughout the municipal bond market. After all, bonds backed 
by the full faith-and-credit of local government entities have long been 
considered among the safest of investments.”). 
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of Puerto Rico’s inhabitants and leaving one-third of the 
island’s population unable to access clean water.109 Two weeks 
later, Hurricane Maria made landfall on Puerto Rico.110 
Strong winds and catastrophic flooding destroyed the island’s 
power grid and, in some areas, destroyed eighty to ninety 
percent of homes and public infrastructure, such as roads and 
bridges.111 
Given the impact of these storms and the island’s growing 
financial needs for the recovery effort, the FOMB and the 
governor agreed to discard the previously certified fiscal plan 
and develop a new one.112 Not only would this plan reflect the 
additional cost to rebuild the island, but it would also 
incorporate updated assumptions about population migration 
and changes to the tax base as a result of the hurricanes.113  
In January 2018, the governor submitted a new proposed 
fiscal plan to the FOMB for consideration.114 Changes to the 
analysis turned the formerly projected surplus into a $3.4 
billion deficit that would accumulate over the next several 
 
109 See Robinson Meyer, What’s Happening with the Relief Effort in 
Puerto Rico?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
science/archive/2017/10/what-happened-in-puerto-rico-a-timeline-of-
hurricane-maria/541956/ [https://perma.cc/UHD5-JY9N]. 
110 See id. 
111 Id. 
112 APR. 2018 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 5, at 2. 
113 Patricia Mazzei & Mary Williams Walsh, Hurricane-Torn Puerto 
Rico Says It Can’t Pay Any of Its Debts for 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/us/puerto-rico-budget-
hurricanes.html [https://perma.cc/RPV3-4C9B] (noting that the previous 
plan “had to be reworked in light of Maria’s vast devastation, which 
prompted tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans to flee the island amid job 
layoffs and power blackouts.”). 
114 Dawn Giel, Puerto Rico Unveils Revised Fiscal Plan: No Debt Service 
Payments for the Next 5 Years, CNBC (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/01/25/puerto-rico-unveils-revised-fiscal-plan-no-debt-service-
payments-for-the-next-5-years.html [https://perma.cc/29ET-R5RG]; see also 
Press Release, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., Oversight Board To 
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years.115 In response to this drastic change, the plan called for 
a moratorium on servicing the island’s debts for at least five 
years, suggesting that bond holders would ultimately receive 
as little as five cents on the dollar.116  
On February 13, 2018, Governor Ricardo Rosselló released 
a revised plan that incorporated $18 billion in additional 
funds allocated by the federal government in a 2018 budget 
bill.117 This infusion of capital would transform Puerto Rico’s 
projected deficit back to a surplus of around $3.4 billion over 
the next six years.118 However, the additional federal money 
was clearly earmarked for the island’s recovery and 
reconstruction efforts rather than the servicing of bondholder 
debt.119  
 
115 Nick Brown, In Bleak Forecast, Puerto Rico Sees No Debt Payment 




116 The new fiscal plan projects that Hurricane Maria will spur 
increased inflation, nearly triple a contraction in gross national product in 
2018, and drive around 600,000 more people from the island in the next five 
years. Id. As a result, the new fiscal plan no longer shows the island with a 
surplus over the next several years but anticipates a $3.4 billion gap over 
the next several years. Id.; see also Steven Mufson, Puerto Rico Offers Fiscal 





117 Hilary Russ, Revised Puerto Rico Fiscal Plan Taps Federal Budget 




119 Steven Mufson, In Puerto Rico, a Skirmish over How Much Debt the 




=.34999dbdd555 [https://perma.cc/VFF7-TYQN].  
  In a letter sent in February 2018, several members of Congress and the 
Senate sought to clarify with the FOMB that the money allocated to the 
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After two more months of unsuccessful negotiations to 
draft a mutually-acceptable plan with Governor Rosselló,120 
the FOMB decided to exercise its power to unilaterally 
propose, vote on, and certify a plan.121 The plan was approved 
by a vote of six to one on April 19, 2018122 despite public 
opposition from the Governor, who stated that the FOMB 
lacked authority to impose the pension cuts and labor reforms 
included in the plan.123 The plan forecasted that without the 
proposed fiscal and structural measures, the island’s deficit 
over the next six years would total $5.2 billion; however, if the 
plan was properly enacted, the island would see a net surplus 
of $6.7 billion, which could be used for debt payment through 
2023.124 
Several weeks after the plan was initially certified, a group 
of creditors approached the FOMB with a compromise that 
would eliminate $10 billion of the current outstanding debt 
obligations but guarantee creditors of different bond types a 
particular division of debt service.125 The deal would move the 
 
island in February 2018 was “100 percent” intended for use only in 
rebuilding the island and helping the residents recover from the hurricane. 
Letter from Nydia M. Velazquez, Member of Cong., Sean Duffy, Member of 
Cong., Tom MacArthur, Member of Cong., Raúl M. Grijalva, Member of 
Cong., Luis V. Guitiérrez, Member Of Cong., Robert Menéndez, U.S. 
Senator & Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, to José B. Carrión III, 




120 Arthur Laffer, Puerto Rico’s ‘Shortsighted’ Fiscal Plan Totally 
‘Misses the Mark’, CNBC (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/03/02/puerto-ricos-new-fiscal-plan-misses-the-mark-
commentary.html [https://perma.cc/FA7X-N88U]. 
121 Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Board’s Turnaround Plan Promises More 
Austerity, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
puertorico-debt-fiscal/puerto-rico-boards-turnaround-plan-promises-more-
austerity-idUSKBN1HP3B4 [https://perma.cc/C7QY-M6UF]. 
122 See generally APR. 2018 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 5. 
123 Brown, supra note 20. 
124 Id.; see also APR. 2018 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 5, at 123. 
125 Andrew Scurria, Puerto Rico Bondholders Pitch $10 Billion Debt-
Cutting Deal, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/ 
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island’s pledged taxes into a separate account and distribute 
securities to participating creditors at a discount of about 
sixty cents on the dollar for various bondholders.126 The 
FOMB, however, rejected this proposed settlement, stating 
that it was “completely unaffordable” for the island.127  
The FOMB and the governor also began working together 
to approve a budget for the next fiscal year that adhered to 
the approved fiscal plan. The first budget, submitted in early 
May, was rejected by the FOMB because it did not reflect 
provisions within the certified fiscal plan, including the 
elimination of Christmas bonuses for public servants and 
incorporation of labor reforms, such as pension cuts.128 In 
response, Governor Rosselló reiterated his refusal to honor 
these elements of the plan.129 After several discussions with 
the FOMB, however, the two parties negotiated a 
compromise—the FOMB agreed to reverse the decision to 
eliminate Christmas bonuses and reduce vacation and sick 
leave for public workers, and, in exchange, the governor 
promised that the territory would adopt an at-will 
employment scheme for the private sector as part of an 
overhaul of local labor laws.130 The FOMB also agreed to 
 
articles/puerto-rico-bondholders-pitch-10-billion-debt-cutting-deal-
1526304771 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Nick Brown, Update 1-Board Rejects Puerto Rico’s Proposed Budget, 




129  See Michelle Kaske & Yalixa Rivera, Puerto Rican Police Clash with 
Workers Protesting Pension Cuts, BLOOMBERG (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-01/puerto-rico-workers-
protest-u-s-plan-to-slash-their-pensions [https://perma.cc/3SLY-KG24]. 
Since the FOMB’s plan, there has been increasing protests from local 
workers regarding these provisions that hurt local employees. Id. 
130 Danica Coto, Puerto Rico Gov Submits $25B Budget Amid Deal with 
Board, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 22, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/ 
d2ce13b374da43409c0b751874860064 [https://perma.cc/SE76-2SEM]. 
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update the previously-certified fiscal plan to reflect these 
agreed-upon changes.131 
However, two months after this compromise was struck, 
the FOMB announced that it was in the process of recertifying 
a new fiscal plan because the local legislature had failed to 
enact the labor reforms laid out at the end of May.132 By the 
end of June 2018, the FOMB had a new plan.133 In particular, 
this plan cut the money available to the government over the 
next thirty years from almost $40 billion to $14 billion.134 
These new projections also imply that the money available for 
debt service would be significantly reduced.135  
 
131 Puerto Rico, Oversight Board Reach Deal on Fiscal Plan, REUTERS 
(May 21, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/puertorico-debt-fiscalplan/ 
puerto-rico-oversight-board-reach-deal-on-fiscal-plan-idUSN9N1RF02J 
[https://perma.cc/GKV5-S9FW].  
132 Hazel Bradford, Puerto Rico Oversight Board to Recertify Fiscal 
Plan; COFINA Bondholders Close to Agreement, PENSIONS & INV. (June 29, 
2018), https://www.pionline.com/article/20180629/ONLINE/180629812/ 
puerto-rico-oversight-board-to-recertify-fiscal-plan-cofina-bondholders-
close-to-agreement [https://perma.cc/542R-UU9B]; see also FIN. OVERSIGHT 
& MGMT. BD. FOR P.R., STRUCTURAL REFORMS (May 30, 2018), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zLKIiI_DLJj3ytMlpQsI1orgrXlpqi4D/view 
[https://perma.cc/LPZ8-K6C2]. 
133 FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. FOR P.R., NEW FISCAL PLAN FOR PUERTO 
RICO: RESTORING GROWTH AND PROSPERITY (June 29, 2018), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c9LACF1yzSi1sUElNVaZHklo93TJR55M/v
iew [https://perma.cc/L6LD-XW2L]; see also Letter from Natalie A. Jaresko, 
Exec. Dir., Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., to Ricardo A. Rosselló 
Nevares, Governor of P.R., Thomas Rivera Schatz, President of the Senate 
of P.R., Carlos J. Méndez Núñez, Speaker of the House of Representatives 
of P.R. (June 29, 2018), https://drive.google.com/file/d/ 
1A4Hjh3dohOtsLDVm6Qlc5bXcEVRR_p5J/view [https://perma.cc/85NB-
77KJ] (summarizing changes to the fiscal plan from previous iteration). 
134 Luis Valentin Ortiz, Puerto Rico Oversight Board Certifies New 




135 Id.  
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Finally, in October 2018, the FOMB updated its financial 
analyses and certified a revised fiscal plan.136 The plan makes 
several new assumptions about structural and fiscal reforms 
that the FOMB anticipates will create a cumulative surplus of 
about $30 billion through 2033.137 More specifically, the 
FOMB believes the plan is more realistic than the version 
certified in June—this new plan accounts for new 
assumptions about a population reduction, debt adjustment 
plans,138 and an $82 billion infusion of federal disaster and 
private insurance funds.139 On the other hand, the plan also 
reflects what the FOMB considers to be the local government’s 
“lack of a political will” to make further beneficial structural 
reforms, including those to local labor laws, that the FOMB 
believes would stop economic decline.140 As of February 2019, 
this remains the operative plan in place. 
E. Further Challenges for Puerto Rico, Creditor 
Confidence, and Austerity Measures  
The stated purpose of PROMESA, the FOMB, and the 
complex set of processes that the board oversees is to help the 
island achieve fiscal responsibility and ultimately reestablish 
access to credit markets.141 That access is contingent upon 
creditor confidence, which is difficult to rebuild after a 
territory has been insolvent.142 However, reconstructing 
 
136 OCT. 2018 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 28, at 7; see also FIN. OVERSIGHT 
& MGMT. BD. FOR P.R., CERTIFIED FISCAL PLAN FACT SHEET, 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uimOkrz5D9avtQC-pu39vKLoyBN3uOlz/ 
view [https://perma.cc/2VTY-7QWJ]. 
137 Eva Lloréns Vélez, Puerto Rico Fiscal Plan Predicts Surplus if 
Reforms Are Carried Out, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://caribbeanbusiness.com/puerto-rico-fiscal-plan-predicts-surplus-if-
fiscal-reforms-are-carried-out/ [https://perma.cc/R2AE-3DKZ]. 
138 See id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id.  
141 See PROMESA § 101(a), 48 U.S.C. § 2121(a) (2012); see also id. § 
201(b)(1) (“A Fiscal Plan developed under this section shall . . . provide a 
method to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.”). 
142 For example, in discussing the Great Recession, Chairman Ben 
Bernanke stated that “[a]s investors and creditors lost confidence in the 
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Puerto Rico’s creditworthiness, especially in the eyes of 
investors, is uniquely difficult for two reasons. 
First, Puerto Rico’s debt is a complex system of funding 
sources and legal guarantees.143 The island’s inability to repay 
certain debt obligations is not only harmful to Puerto Rico’s 
reputation as a debtor in the future, but also weakens the 
territory’s credibility in offering important legal guarantees to 
its creditors in the event of default.  
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has two main classes of 
protected bondholders: GO creditors and Puerto Rico Sales 
Tax Financing Corporation (“COFINA”) creditors.144 
According to the Puerto Rico constitution, holders of GO bonds 
have a first lien on all general government revenues.145 
 
ability of certain firms to meet their obligations, their access to capital 
markets as well as to short-term funding markets became increasingly 
impaired[.]” Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the 
Economic Club of New York: Stabilizing the Financial Markets and the 
Economy (Oct. 15, 2008) (transcript available at https://www.federal 
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081015a.htm 
[http://perma.cc/AL5Z-8JTF]). 
143 At the highest level, Puerto Rico’s debt obligations can be divided 
into two broad categories: bonds considered by investors to be 
constitutionally protected and those that are not. Ken Sweet, Q&A: Puerto 
Rico’s Debt Crisis Explained, BUS. INSIDER (May 2, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-qa-puerto-ricos-debt-crisis-explained-
2016-5 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). For instance, 
creditors invested in bonds issued under the Puerto Rico Infrastructure 
Financing Authority or Government Development Bank are considered low 
to middle priority bonds that are not backed by any strong guarantees for 
repayment. Id. On the other hand, bonds issued by the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico are guaranteed payment in the text of Puerto Rico’s 
constitution. Id.  
144 Robert Slavin, GO vs. COFINA Battle Lies Ahead, BOND BUYER 
(May 19, 2017), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/go-vs-cofina-battle-lies-
ahead (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
145 In other words, the first use for any available government revenue 
should be to pay off the Commonwealth’s debt to GO creditors. See id. 
Article VI, section 8 of Puerto Rico’s Constitution reads: “In case the 
available revenues including surplus for any fiscal year are insufficient to 
meet the appropriations made for that year, interest on the public debt and 
amortization thereof shall first be paid[.]” P.R. CONST., art. VI, § 8; see also 
Richard Epstein, A Political and Constitutional Analysis of Puerto Rican 
Debt Crisis, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
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COFINA creditors, however, insist that they enjoy a strong, 
statutorily-established priority over all sales revenue of the 
island.146 The dispute between these two classes of creditors is 
rooted in conflicting readings of constitutional and statutory 
guarantees—GO bondholders believe they have a claim over 
revenues, including sales and use taxes; however, COFINA 
bondholders believe that because their bonds are serviced 
through tax revenues that flow into a separate fund, this sum 
of money should not be accessible to GO creditors.147 
While COFINA creditors recently made headway in 
resolving this dispute with GO creditor counterparts by 
gathering consensus for a broad debt restructuring plan,148 
both classes of creditors still hold explicit promises from the 




GO priority is further affirmed in Puerto Rico’s Management and Budget 
Office Act of 1980, which establishes “priority guidelines that place first the 
payment of interest and amortization corresponding to the public debt.” Id. 
See generally P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, §§ 101–110 (1980). 
146 See Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA), GOV’T 
DEV. BANK FOR P.R., http://www.gdb-pur.com/investors_resources/ 
cofina.html [https://perma.cc/Z4E9-F55X]. COFINA bonds were initially 
issued to raise funds for the Commonwealth to repay debt obligations of 
other entities. Id. These obligations are paid from and secured by a 
particular security interest in sales tax revenue. Id. Separately, the 
government enacted Act 91 which created a “Dedicated Sales Tax Fund” 
that is held separate from the Commonwealth’s General Fund, and which 
is used to pay COFINA bond holders. Id. 
147 Additionally, the Commonwealth defaulted on its GO payment in 
July 2017; however, it has continued to pay its COFINA bonds. Slavin, 
supra note 144.  
148 See Holdout Bondholders Join Puerto Rico Sales Tax Debt 
Restructuring, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/usa-puertorico-bonds/holdout-bondholders-join-puerto-rico-sales-
tax-debt-restructuring-idUSL2N1W70V7 [https://perma.cc/V6B5-WABY]. 
For more information on the importance of this debt restructuring deal, see 
Brad W. Setser, Will the Proposed Restructuring of COFINA Bonds Assure 
Puerto Rico’s Return to Debt Sustainability?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
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priority over other uses of tax revenue. Despite these formal 
protections, there have been efforts to enact legislation or 
otherwise disburse payments to other parties in conflict with 
these guarantees.149 More importantly, many aspects of 
previously proposed and certified fiscal plans appear to 
disregard these protections without much explanation.150 
Despite the strong social policy reasons for these particular 
financial resource allocations, creditors still assert that the 
fiscal plan drafting process has “[undermined] investor 
confidence in Puerto Rico’s commitment to paying debts, 
making Puerto Rico unlikely to be able to regain access to the 
credit markets at reasonable interest rates.”151 This, 
unfortunately, will have long-term impacts on the island’s 
ability to recover and grow in the future.  
Second, while other cities and municipalities that have 
gone through insolvency proceedings have eventually been 
able to regain access to credit markets, the processes were 
extremely difficult and involved other mechanisms 
 
149 For example, Governor Rosselló, with the cooperation of the FOMB, 
pushed legislation through Puerto Rico’s House and Senate that would 
assure the priority of pension obligations over other bond debts, and treat 
these pension rights as vested as of the date of the enactment rather than 
the date of retirement, thus expediting the maturity of pension obligations 
and reducing the opportunity for creditors to get their appropriate share of 
the underlying revenue. Epstein, supra note 145. 
150 See Nick Brown & Daniel Bases, Puerto Rico’s Major Bondholders 
Critical of Fiscal Turnaround Plan, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt/puerto-ricos-major-
bondholders-critical-of-fiscal-turnaround-plan-idUSKBN16Z1OP 
[https://perma.cc/HXA5-UV55] (“[C]reditors said the plan runs afoul of 
PROMESA by prioritizing government services ahead of general obligation 
debt in violation of the island’s constitution. COFINA creditors said it would 
also unlawfully transfer sales tax revenue, on which they have a lien, into 
the island’s general fund.”); see also Letter from The Ad Hoc Group of P.R. 
General Obligation Bondholders, Major COFINA Bondholders, and Assured 
Guaranty Corp. and Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp., to Members of the 
Oversight Bd. (Mar. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Joint Creditor Letter], 
https://www.scribd.com/document/343224256/Joint-Creditor-Letter-to-
Oversight-Board-on-Fiscal-Plan-for-Puerto-Rico [https://perma.cc/GX6S-
RXM9]; Creditor Press Release, supra note 16. 
151 Joint Creditor Letter, supra note 150, at 10. 
  
No. 1:367] THE PERFECT STORM 399 
unavailable to Puerto Rico. In 1975, New York City found 
itself in a dire fiscal crisis after years of poor financial control 
and chronic budget deficits.152 New York Governor Hugh 
Carey took drastic cost-cutting measures153 and encouraged 
the creation of several control boards and oversight entities to 
help facilitate the city’s financial recovery process.154 
Nevertheless, municipal creditors were still reluctant to lend 
the city money.155 Eventually, the federal government 
intervened and extended $2.3 billion in short-term loans to 
the city.156 However, it was not until 1979 that the city was 
again able to sell short-term bonds on the financing market.157 
More recently, Detroit, which is in the midst of its own 
municipal bankruptcy, took two years to regain access to the 
bond market. 158 However, even when the city was able to 
 
152 George Sweeting & Andrea Dineen, New York City and Los Angeles: 
Taxes, Budgets, and Managing the Fiscal Crisis, in NEW YORK AND LOS 
ANGELES: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE 193, 207 (David Halle & Andrew A. 
Beveridge eds., 2013). 
153 Such cost-cutting measures included instituting a wage freeze, 
laying off employees, and reducing subsidies to the subway system. See id. 
at 209. 
154 State legislation created the Municipal Assistance Corporation, 
which was authorized to refinance the city’s maturing notes by selling 
bonds, and the Emergency Financial Control Board, which had the power 
to control the city’s bank accounts, control or remove city officials, and 
review the city’s financial plans, budgets, negotiated contracts, and 
borrowing agreements. Id. at 208–09.  
155 Robert Dunstan, Overview of New York City’s Fiscal Crisis, 3 CAL. 
RES. BUREAU, Mar. 1, 1995, at 5, https://www.scribd.com/document/ 
149562131/Overview-of-New-York-City-s-Fiscal-Crisis-1995 (on file with 
the Columbia Business Law Review).  
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 7. It took the city another two years to issue investment-grade 
bonds after it achieved a balanced budget. Id. “Investment grade” bonds are 
assessed and rated by rating agencies and should be contrasted with “high-
yield” or “junk” bonds, which are considered speculative and highly risky 
from a payback perspective. See Fidelity Learning Center, Bond Ratings, 
FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investment-products/ 
fixed-income-bonds/bond-ratings [https://perma.cc/942L-NBRU].  
158 Aaron Kuriloff, Detroit Sells First Municipal Bonds Since Emerging 
from Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/detroit-sells-first-municipal-bonds-since-emerging-from-
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borrow again, it had to pay investors a significant interest rate 
premium due to the recent insolvency.159 By that time, Detroit 
had cut $7 billion from its debt obligations, leaving certain 
groups of creditors to recover around forty percent of the 
outstanding debt.160 
In an effort to help the city, Michigan Governor Rick 
Snyder enacted legislation giving bondholders first claim to 
income taxes, essentially creating a guarantee that Detroit’s 
bonds would be backed by the full faith and credit of the 
state.161 In August 2015, Detroit sold its first set of post-
bankruptcy bonds.162 Despite these unique structural 
guarantees and the bond’s investment-grade rating,163 the 
bonds still cost the city over a percentage point more in 
interest payments than similarly rated debt.164 Several 
months later, Detroit sold its first general obligation bonds 
after exiting bankruptcy.165 However, according to some 
analysts, “Detroit would likely struggle if it were to sell bonds 
under its own name,” as these bonds were attractive to 
investors only because they were backed by Michigan’s tax 
revenue.166  
 
bankruptcy-1440008673 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
Detroit filed for bankruptcy in July 2013. Matthew Dolan, Detroit Exits 
Municipal Bankruptcy Case, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2014), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/detroit-municipal-bankruptcy-case-to-end-
1418229066?mod=article_inline (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review). 
159 Kuriloff, supra note 158. 
160 Elizabeth Campbell, Bankruptcy Will Cost Detroit on New Bonds, 
DETROIT NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/ 
news/local/detroit-city/2015/08/18/city-bonds-cost-taxpayers/ 
31917989/ [https://perma.cc/4AEZ-YSMB].  
161 Id. 
162 Kuriloff, supra note 158. 
163 Campbell, supra note 160. The city itself still had a “junk” credit 
rating. Id. 
164 Kuriloff, supra note 158.  
165 Edward Krudy, Update 2-Detroit Prices First GO Bonds Since 
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Puerto Rico has yet to receive federal loans to assist with 
debt servicing the way New York City did during its 
bankruptcy.167 Similarly, the island does not have the benefit 
of a contractual or legislative guarantee from a large, solvent 
state. Ironically, some of the island’s most pressing 
controversies among creditors right now stem from the 
existence of similar bond terms and guarantees. Additionally, 
Detroit creditors were able to recoup much more of their 
outstanding debt than Puerto Rico creditors currently 
anticipate.168  
These realities indicate that in addition to focusing on how 
the island will resolve its current fiscal problems, Puerto Rico 
must also remain cognizant of the long-term hurdles that exist 
in rebuilding creditor confidence, especially since the island 
cannot rely on methods other municipalities have employed 
upon exiting bankruptcy proceedings. 
Beyond the complicated details of Puerto Rico’s debt 
obligations, there are also many critical, real-world 
considerations about how the territory’s bankruptcy has 
negatively impacted local citizens. After the FOMB recertified 
a revised fiscal plan in October 2018, both Governor Rosselló 
and several Democratic members of Congress expressed 
concern that the plan’s austere fiscal measures—which call 
for a $629 million reduction in spending on education, 
pensions, and healthcare—would only create a surplus that 
 
167 The federal government has indicated that there would be no bailout 
of the bondholders. See, e.g., Justin Sink & Jennifer Epstein, No U.S. 
Bailout for Puerto Rican Debt, Trump’s Budget Chief Says, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 
4, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-04/trump-
suggests-puerto-rico-s-debt-may-need-to-be-wiped-out 
[https://perma.cc/5GJ2-WYLL]. Most of the federal money given to Puerto 
Rico has been focused on recovery efforts. See Patricia Mazzei, What Puerto 
Rico Is, and Isn’t, Getting in Disaster Relief, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/us/puerto-rico-disaster-relief.html 
[https://perma.cc/5GJ2-WYLL]. 
168 Detroit shed about $7 billion of its $18 billion of debt obligations, 
meaning creditors suffered, on average, a haircut of around thirty-eight 
percent. Krudy, supra note 165. 
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would go directly to current creditor bondholders.169 Because 
the pie of government dollars is fixed, any dollar reallocated 
to servicing bondholders is a dollar shifted from important 
social programs or disaster relief efforts. These changes are 
especially detrimental to local citizens who have been 
struggling to recover from financial downturns and the 
destruction of Hurricane Maria and Irma. 
Therefore, the FOMB is dealing with fundamentally 
conflicting interests and must carefully craft a fiscal plan that 
appeases all parties’ diverse social and economic interests. 
Given this complex reality, the FOMB is susceptible to a 
variety of legal challenges from creditors, Governor Rosselló, 
and local citizens who take issue with the allocation of 
government money in these multi-year bankruptcy plans that 
will heavily shape the territory’s fiscal future. The following 
two sections provide in-depth discussions of these challenges, 
and consider whether there are valid legal claims to be made 
against the FOMB’s fiscal plans. 
III. PROMESA AND A LEGAL CHALLENGE TO THE 
FISCAL PLAN 
As described in Part II, both Puerto Rico’s creditors and 
other interested parties on the island have strong interests in 
a systematic and equitable resolution to the island’s debt 
problems. While PROMESA provides specific requirements 
that must be satisfied before a fiscal plan can be ratified,170 
the FOMB possesses “sole discretion” to determine whether 
these particular statutory stipulations are in fact met.171 If 
they disagree with the underlying components of the plan, 
 
169 Puerto Rico Gov: Fiscal Board’s Austerity Plan Would Affect Gov’t 
Services, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://caribbeanbusiness.com/ 
puerto-rico-gov-fiscal-boards-austerity-plan-would-affect-govt-services/ 
[https://perma.cc/2AGV-N66J]; see also Megan Cerullo, Rep. Nydia 
Velazquez Challenges Continuing Austerity Measures Included in Puerto 
Rico Fiscal Plan, DAILY NEWS (Oct. 30, 2018), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
news/national/ny-news-puerto-rico-fiscal-plan-nydia-velazquez-20181030-
story.html [https://perma.cc/E9SH-Z8X8]. 
170 See PROMESA § 201(b), 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b) (2012). 
171 See id. § 201(c)(3). 
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stakeholders may choose to bring a legal challenge examining 
whether these crucial decisions adhere to the text and 
underlying purpose of PROMESA.172  
The first challenge that a stakeholder could assert is that 
a fiscal plan violates the mandated requirements in 
PROMESA.173 For example, GO and COFINA bondholders 
have made it clear that their legal claims over particular 
categories of revenue seem to have been summarily 
disregarded in past iterations of the plan.174 Similarly, other 
investors, such as bond insurers, have taken issue with the 
fiscal plans’ allocation of financial resources to purposes they 




173 In particular, PROMESA requires that the fiscal plan “ensure that 
assets, funds, or resources . . . are not loaned to, transferred to, or otherwise 
used for the benefit” of other entities—in other words, the fiscal plan cannot 
shift funds allocated to service one set of debt obligations to service another 
set of creditors. Id. § 201(b)(1)(M). Relatedly, the fiscal plan shall also 
“respect the relative lawful priorities or lawful liens . . . in the constitution, 
other laws, or agreements[.]” Id. § 201(b)(1)(N). 
174 See Joint Creditor Letter, supra note 150, at 3, 4 (stating that with 
respect to GO bondholders, “[b]y providing that payment on Constitutional 
Debt comes after all of the Commonwealth’s expenditures, the Fiscal Plan 
violates Puerto Rico’s Constitution and Section 201(b)(1)(N)” and with 
respect to COFINA bondholders, the “Fiscal Plan violates Section 
201(b)(1)(M) by transferring COFINA’s property to the Commonwealth’s 
General Fund and violates Section 201(b)(1)(N) by failing to respect the 
COFINA bondholders’ lien on the assigned revenues granted to COFINA.”) 
(emphasis in original).  
175 See Adversary Complaint at 27, Assured Guar. Corp. v. Puerto Rico, 
301 F. Supp. 3d 288 (D.P.R. 2017) (No. 17 BK 3283), [hereinafter Assured 
Guaranty Complaint] (citing that the fiscal plan violates various 
constitutional and contract debt priority provisions because “it assumes 
that all non-debt expenses of the Commonwealth government are to be paid 
before any payments are made for debt service.”) (emphasis in original); 
Adversary Complaint at 4, Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Puerto Rico, No. 17 
BK 3283 (D.P.R. June 8, 2017) [hereinafter Ambac Complaint] (“[T]he Fiscal 
Plan . . . downgrad[es] the most senior debt obligations of the 
Commonwealth and its instrumentalities . . . to the very bottom of the 
payment priority waterfall . . . and in the process, imposes a 77.4% haircut 
on debt obligations[.]”). 
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But on the other side, Democratic congressional leaders 
have expressed concern with the October 2018 certified fiscal 
plan, stating that “Congress never intended PROMESA to be 
used to grant Puerto Rico’s creditors a priority, yet [the 
FOMB’s] fiscal plans would appear to do so, which is a clear 
contravention of Congressional intent.”176 
Before it can resolve the merits of these concerns, however, 
a court would first have to assess an important threshold 
question, which is whether it even has jurisdiction to hear any 
challenges by stakeholders brought against a fiscal plan. 
Section 106(a) of PROMESA provides that a district court has 
jurisdiction over “any action against the [FOMB], and any 
action otherwise arising out of [PROMESA] in whole or in 
part[.]”177 While this seemingly grants federal courts 
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims challenging the FOMB’s 
actions relating to the certification of the fiscal plan, section 
106(e) appears to create an explicit carve out, clarifying that 
federal district courts do not in fact have jurisdiction “to 
review challenges to the [FOMB’s] certification 
determinations under this Act.”178 Without knowing the 
definition of the operative phrase “certification 
determination,” it is unclear whether substantive challenges 
from any stakeholder to the existing fiscal plan can be heard 
by courts pursuant to section 106(a) or whether such claims 
would be captured by the explicit exception in section 106(e).  
Section III.A lays out the analytical path a court may take 
in assessing the possible interpretations of PROMESA’s 
jurisdictional provisions.179 Section III.B then takes these 
 
176 Letter from Nydia M. Valázquez, Member of Cong., Darren Soto, 
Member of Cong., José E. Serrano, Member of Cong. & Elizabeth Warren, 
U.S. Senator, to José B. Carrión III, Chairman, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. 
for P.R. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.puertoricoreport.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/document1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG4D-GB66]. 
177 PROMESA § 106(a). 
178 Id. § 106(e).  
179 In March 2017, several bond insurers, including Assured Guaranty 
Corporation (“Assured Guaranty”) and Ambac Assurance Corporation 
(“Ambac”), brought separate suits in the District of Puerto Rico against the 
Commonwealth government and the FOMB claiming that the plan violated 
provisions within PROMESA and the U.S. Constitution. See generally 
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analyses and considers how a court may resolve the issue of 
whether the statutory text prohibits federal courts from 
exercising jurisdiction over legal challenges to FOMB fiscal 
plans.  
A. Judicial Challenge Under Section 106 of PROMESA 
PROMESA section 106 proscribes the treatment of actions 
arising under the Act, and contains the “certification 
determination” phrase that is central to understanding the 
scope of court review of fiscal plan challenges.180 The Section 
below addresses the interpretation of the section 106 
 
Assured Guaranty Complaint, supra note 175; Ambac Complaint, supra 
note 175. Specifically, Assured Guaranty and Ambac claimed that the fiscal 
plan violated the Constitution’s Takings Clause, Contract Clause, and 
procedural and substantive due process protections. Assured Guaranty 
Complaint, supra note 175, at 4; Ambac Complaint, supra note 175., at 6. 
However, this Note will only focus on the challenge under PROMESA and 
the procedural due process claim. 
In response to these legal claims, the FOMB moved to dismiss, citing 
that PROMESA explicitly denied district courts the jurisdiction to hear 
challenges related to the certification of a fiscal plan and also argued that 
the parties did not have valid constitutional claims. See Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), Assured 
Guar. Corp. v. Puerto Rico, 301 F. Supp. 3d 288 (D.P.R. 2017) (No. 17 BK 
3283), rev’d sub nom. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 872 F.3d 
57 (1st Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss Assured Guaranty]; 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 
and (b)(6), Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Puerto Rico, 17 BK 3283 (D.P.R. July 
28, 2017), rev’d sub nom. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 872 
F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss Ambac]. 
Due to Hurricane Maria, Assured Guaranty voluntarily withdrew its 
complaint. See Assured Guaranty Pulls Puerto Rico Lawsuit, Cites 
Hurricane, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
puertorico-debt-assured/assured-guaranty-pulls-puerto-rico-lawsuit-cites-
hurricane-idUSKBN1CC0J9 [https://perma.cc/LTQ5-EZFD]. 
On May 23, 2018, Assured Guaranty renewed their challenge against 
Puerto Rico and the FOMB, this time challenging the newly-certified April 
fiscal plan. See Adversary Complaint, Assured Guar. Corp. v. Puerto Rico, 
17 BK 3283 (D.P.R. May 23, 2018) [hereinafter Assurance Guaranty 
Adversary Complaint]. Some of the arguments discussed in this Note mirror 
those brought and discussed above.  
180 See PROMESA § 106. 
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jurisdictional issue in three parts. Section III.A.1 first 
considers the plain meaning of the phrase “certification 
determinations,” which is not explicitly defined in PROMESA. 
Section III.A.2 then broadens the analysis and evaluates how 
the phrase may be particularly meaningful in the context of 
the FOMB’s other responsibilities under PROMESA. Finally, 
Section III.A.3 examines how references to the section 106(e) 
exception elsewhere in the Act might provide additional 
insight as to the scope of the provision.  
1. Plain Meaning Analysis of Section 106(e)  
To interpret the meaning of the phrase “certification 
determinations,” a court will first consider “whether the 
language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with 
regard to the particular dispute in the case.”181 Neither the 
words individually nor the words combined as a phrase are 
explicitly defined within PROMESA.  
Because the phrase has no clear meaning in the statute, 
courts will next look to “[give] the words used their ordinary 
meaning.”182 In standard usage, the word “certification” is 
used to describe the act of “attesting,” or more specifically “the 
process of giving someone or something an official document 
stating that a specified standard has been satisfied.”183 The 
term “determination” refers to “[t]he act of deciding something 
officially.”184  
When these terms are read together under ordinary 
grammar principles, the term “certification” acts as an 
adjective modifier of the noun “determination,” suggesting 
that it limits the scope of the exception in section 106(e) to one 
category of determinations—those that relate to certifications. 
Thus, district courts would be precluded from exercising 
 
181 Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 100 (2012) (internal 
quotations omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 
(1997)). 
182 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. 
v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 519 U.S. 248, 255 
(1997)). 
183 Certification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
184 Determination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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jurisdiction over the FOMB’s actions that are characterized as 
delivering a certification subsequent to an official decision. 
2. Certification Determinations Versus Other 
Determinations  
The Supreme Court recognizes, however, that statutory 
language “cannot be construed in a vacuum. . . . [and] words 
of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to 
their place in the overall statutory scheme.”185 This broader 
analysis is particularly applicable in this situation, as section 
106(e) applies to “certification determinations under this 
Act.”186 
The FOMB’s responsibilities fall into two distinct 
categories. The first category is composed of determinations 
that the FOMB makes in furtherance of some affirmative 
conclusion or action. For example, the FOMB has “sole 
discretion” to propose and implement an adapted method of 
financial accounting if it determines the local government is 
incapable of comprehensive reporting that complies with the 
default standard.187 Under these circumstances, the FOMB 
has discretion to change an administrative guideline; 
however, a further certification step does not follow such a 
determination.188 
These responsibilities are distinguishable from the second 
category of FOMB discretionary powers. These are 
determinations that are made official through the formal 
delivery of a certification. For example, in the context of fiscal 
plans, the FOMB must first “determine whether [any 
proposed plan] satisfies the requirements set forth” earlier in 
the provision and once the FOMB has made that substantive 
 
185 Roberts, 566 U.S. at 101 internal quotations omitted) (quoting Davis 
v. Mich. Dep’t. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). 
186 PROMESA § 106(e), 48 U.S.C. § 2126(e) (2012) (emphasis added). 
187 See, e.g., id. § 5(1). 
188 Other illustrations of decisions that fall into this first category 
include the FOMB’s determination that an instrumentality is subject to, or 
excluded from, the requirements of PROMESA, and the FOMB’s 
determination to hire experts and consulting professionals as necessary. See 
id. §§ 101(d)–(h). 
  
408 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
determination, the FOMB shall approve the plan.189 However, 
once the fiscal plan has been approved, the FOMB “shall 
deliver a compliance certification” to the governor and the 
Puerto Rico legislature.190 Consistent with its plain meaning 
definition, and as evidenced by existing FOMB 
communications with local officials,191 this certification serves 
as a formal signal to all relevant parties that a fiscal plan has 
definitively been approved by the appropriate oversight entity 
and is officially authorized for use in dependent PROMESA 
proceedings.192 Similar determinations, subsequently followed 
by a certification, are required for budgets,193 plans of debt 
adjustments, 194 and voluntary agreements.195  
3. In Context of PROMESA: Creditor Collective 
Action Exception  
Despite the conclusions that can be inferred from the 
analysis of the statutory text itself, courts also have a “duty to 
construe statutes, not isolated provisions.”196 In this case, it is 
valuable to consider whether other statements of jurisdiction 
in PROMESA illuminate the scope of section 106(e).  
The only explicit reference to section 106(e) that exists 
within PROMESA is in Title VI, which deals with creditor 
collective actions.197 It states that: “[n]otwithstanding section 
 
189 Id. § 201(c)(3). 
190 Id. § 201(e)(1). 
191 See generally BOARD RESOLUTION, supra note 100.  
192 See, e.g., PROMESA § 204(a)(2)(B) (“If the appropriate entity . . . 
finds that the law is not significantly inconsistent with the Fiscal Plan for 
the fiscal year, it shall issue a certification of such finding.”). 
193 Id. §§ 202(c)–(e). 
194 Id. § 104(j)(3). 
195 Id. § 104(i)(2). It is important to note that in each of these instances, 
the statutory requirement against which the FOMB is judging these plans 
or documents is compliance with the certified fiscal plan, rather than an 
independent set of stipulations such as those listed in § 201(b). 
196 Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 
559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Gustafson 
v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995)).  
197 Creditor collective action allows creditors to retroactively change 
their rights for portions of Puerto Rico’s debt. See AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 
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106(e), there shall be a cause of action to challenge unlawful 
application of this section.”198 This provision therefore negates 
the exception in section 106(e), meaning that federal district 
courts do, in at least this instance, have jurisdiction to review 
challenges brought under this section of PROMESA.  
Section 601 grants the FOMB199 power to determine, and 
subsequently certify, an agreement as long as it is (1) deemed 
consistent with a certified fiscal plan, (2) is in the best 
interests of the creditors, and (3) is feasible.200 Based on the 
structure of this action, it is clear that this particular 
authority would fall under the category of “certification 
determinations.” Thus, pursuant to section 106(e), courts 
would lack jurisdiction to hear any legal challenges against 
these agreements. However, section 601(n)(2) nullifies the 
force of that provision, and courts in this instance would, 
therefore, have jurisdiction to hear certification 
determination claims of this type. 
B. Judicial Conclusions About Jurisdiction to Review 
“Certification Determinations” Under PROMESA 
While PROMESA itself does not define the boundaries of 
this exception to jurisdiction, both textual and contextual 
analyses indicate that section 106(e) does in fact seem to 
prohibit stakeholders, such as creditors, from seeking 
substantive review of FOMB certification decisions, including 
certification of a fiscal plan.  
While the FOMB has certain responsibilities that resemble 
the ordinary decision-making authority of an entity, the 
phrase “certification determination” likely refers to instances 
where the FOMB is compelled by statute to formalize a 
particular determination by delivering an official certification 
 
26. It draws from “collective action clauses” of sovereign bond debt and can 
help to expedite the restructuring process by allowing a supermajority of 
bondholders to agree on restructuring terms that becomes legally binding 
on all bondholders. See id.; see also PROMESA § 601. 
198 PROMESA § 601(n)(2). 
199 Title VI uses the term “administrative supervisor” to refer to the 
FOMB. See id. § 601(a)(1). 
200 Id. § 601(g)(1)(C).  
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to the governor and legislature before proceeding.201 The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the presence of 
contrasting language can indicate an important substantive 
distinction.202 The juxtaposition of different types of FOMB 
determinations throughout the act strongly suggests that only 
decisions made for eventual certification are protected from 
judicial challenge under section 106(e). Since fiscal plans are 
first assessed for compliance with PROMESA statutory 
requirements and then certified by the FOMB, they fall under 
the scope of section 106(e) and cannot be substantively 
reviewed by a court.  
The Supreme Court has also recognized that “where 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”203 Congress 
clearly contemplated the effect of section 106(e) on other 
provisions in PROMESA, as section 601 explicitly nullifies the 
jurisdictional language for one particular FOMB certification 
determination.204 The clear omission of this language in 
section 201, which governs the process of approving and 
certifying fiscal plans, strongly suggests that Congress did in 
fact want to preclude courts from reviewing fiscal plan 
certifications. Otherwise, Congress would have incorporated 
the same language found in section 601 elsewhere throughout 
the act.  
Based on the factors of statutory analysis just described, 
there is little ambiguity that “certification determinations” 
 
201 See supra Section III.A. 
202 See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35–36 
(1992) (“The distinction [the statute at issue in Nordic Vill] establishes—
between suits for monetary claims and suits for other relief—is a familiar 
one, and is suggested by the contrasting language used in subsections (a) 
and (b) (‘claim[s]’) and in subsection (c) (‘determination[s]” of “issue[s]’). . . . 
[It is a] settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such 
fashion that every word has some operative effect.”) (brackets in original) 
(internal citations omitted). 
203 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal brackets 
and quotations omitted). 
204 See supra Section III.A.3. 
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include approvals of fiscal plans, and thus pursuant to section 
106(e), district courts lack jurisdiction to hear related 
substantive challenges. However, while a court may find 
sufficient evidence to resolve the issue of jurisdiction in 
reference to just the text of PROMESA, courts may still briefly 
consider whether such a reading is reasonable given 
Congress’s objective in enacting the law.205  
Precluding judicial recourse to review the FOMB’s actions 
may seem wholly inconsistent with the broader principles 
underlying Congress’s enactment of PROMESA. The law is 
intended to “protect the lawful rights of the Island’s investors” 
such that the island can regain access to capital markets in 
the future.206 The law establishes an oversight entity that 
“play[s] a key role to ensure fairness to creditors and debts” in 
the bankruptcy process,207 and also requires that a fiscal plan 
must respect creditor priorities and liens.208 Consequently, if 
Congress truly wanted to give the FOMB broad and exclusive 
discretion to certify fiscal plans along its own independent 
criteria, it would not have gone through the painstaking task 
 
205 The Supreme Court has typically followed the rule that if the 
statutory language is unambiguous, the Court will have no reason to resort 
to consulting the statute’s legislative history. See, e.g., United States v. 
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997). However, the Court has also recognized that 
in some “rare cases . . . the literal application of a statute will produce a 
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” United 
States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
In that case, “the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, 
controls.” Id. Thus, it can still be informative to consult the legislative 
record and understand whether the proposed, textual reading aligns with 
Congress’s underlying intent.  
206 See PROMESA COMM. SUMMARY, supra note 77, at 1.  
207 Id. at 7; see also Memorandum from Majority Comm. Staff to All 
Nat. Res. Comm. Members 3 (May 23, 2016), 
https://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/markup_memo__h.r._527
8_05.24.16__05.25.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5T6-2C66] (“[T]hese new 
provisions will ensure fiscal plans keep intact the structural hierarchy of 
prioritized debt, and that funds are not illicitly funneled to other 
instrumentality accounts.”). 
208 See PROMESA COMM. SUMMARY, supra note 77, at 3–4. 
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of listing out fourteen comprehensive specifications.209 
Additionally, it seems counterintuitive that Congress would 
deny creditors access to an important enforcement mechanism 
to ensure the FOMB is properly respecting legislative 
stipulations.  
However, other facets of Congress’s thought process in 
enacting PROMESA may cast doubt on these initial 
intuitions. While the preceding logic focuses on the 
requirement that fiscal plans “respect the relative lawful 
priorities or lawful liens,”210 this particular provision is easily 
misinterpreted, as recognized by Representative Raul 
Grijalva during House consideration of the bill.211 During 
committee markup, several amendments to change the word 
“respect” to “comply with” were proposed but subsequently 
rejected.212 Recognizing that the verb “comply with” was 
unduly restrictive, the Committee chose to leave the FOMB 
 
209 See Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 
1659 (2017) (noting that the surplusage cannon of construction presumes 
that each word Congress uses is “there for a reason”); see also Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“We are thus reluctant to treat statutory 
terms as surplusage in any setting. . . . We are especially unwilling to do so 
when the term occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme[.]”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
210 See PROMESA § 201(b)(1)(N), 48 U.S.C. §2141(b)(1)(N) (2012). For 
example, in their letter to the FOMB, Senator Thom Tillis and Senator Tom 
Cotton stated, “We have heard numerous concerns regarding the Fiscal 
Plan’s failure to comply with lawful priorities and liens established by 
Puerto Rico’s Constitution. . . . Multiple creditor groups have asserted that 
the Commonwealth and the [FOMB] have not attempted to negotiate with 
bondholders. . . . This is a violation of both the spirit and letter of 
PROMESA, which plainly intends for the Commonwealth and the [FOMB] 
to make every effort to reach a negotiated settlement with bondholders[.]” 
See Letter from Thom Tillis, U.S. Senator, & Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator, to 
José B. Carrión III, Chairman, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. (Apr. 7, 
2017) [hereinafter Letter from Senator Tillis & Senator Cotton], 
https://www.puertoricoreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Tillisand 
Cottonletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC5U-937P]. 
211 See 162 CONG. REC. H3600–02 (daily ed. June 9, 2016) (statement of 
Rep. Grijalva). 
212 Id. at H3601. 
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with additional “flexibility afforded by the verb ‘respect,’ 
which is more open-ended.”213 
Additionally, Congress was concerned with the speed and 
timing of PROMESA proceedings.214 Leading up to the law’s 
enactment, Puerto Rico was at risk of defaulting on a large 
GO debt payment.215 Despite recognizing that the bill was not 
perfect, Senator Richard Blumenthal urged his colleagues to 
vote for the bill anyway, stating that “[w]e can come back next 
month, next year, or sooner to try to make it better. But there 
is no better bill available this week, before July 1, and the 
impending humanitarian crisis will most affect and most 
enduringly hurt the people of Puerto Rico.”216 These 
sentiments were echoed during House discussions, where 
Representative Alcee Hastings commented that “[t]he people 
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico face an urgent fiscal 
crisis, and this institution’s delay in addressing this crisis has 
left the United States citizens on that island in dire straits.”217  
In light of this context, it is unsurprising that Congress 
might develop particular mechanisms to streamline the 
 
213 See id. Members of Congress believed that the suggestion that 
“respect” should be read as a much stronger provision would be “misleading” 
and “[would] not reflect . . . the bill or the evolution of the language 
throughout the legislative process.” Id. 
214 Note that attributing one sole intent to Congress is oftentimes 
problematic. Compare King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 (2015) (Chief 
Justice Roberts states that Congress based portions of the Affordable Care 
Act on three major reforms: (1) guaranteed issue and community rating 
requirements; (2) a requirement that individuals maintain health insurance 
coverage or make a payment to the IRS; and (3) the tax credits for 
individuals with household incomes between 100 percent and 400 percent 
of the federal poverty line) with id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice 
Scalia states “[i]t is entirely plausible that tax credits were restricted to 
state Exchanges deliberately—for example, in order to encourage States to 
establish their own Exchanges,” thus disagreeing with Chief Justice 
Roberts’s characterization of Congress’s intent being limited to just the 
three reforms specified). 
215 Long, supra note 66. 
216 162 CONG. REC. S4604 (daily ed. June 28, 2016) (statement of Sen. 
Blumenthal). 
217 162 CONG. REC. H3582 (daily ed. June 9, 2016) (statement of Rep. 
Hastings). 
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administrative timeline of PROMESA’s actions.218 Congress is 
likely to have anticipated that challenges to the FOMB’s 
actions could create intractable delays at every critical 
juncture in PROMESA proceedings, and therefore sought to 
limit these diversions.  
In sum, the majority of factors that a court may consider 
in an effort to understand the scope of district court 
jurisdiction in section 106 indicate that stakeholders were 
never intended to have the ability to challenge fiscal plans in 
court. 
IV. DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE UNDER THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 
If courts find that there is no jurisdiction to hear claims 
directly challenging the substantive provisions of a fiscal plan, 
stakeholders may bring an action claiming that the fiscal plan 
certification process in fact violates procedural due process 
rights, especially since courts are prohibited from exercising 
jurisdiction over challenges to the plans themselves. GO, 
COFINA, and other creditors have liens and other 
constitutional or statutory rights that establish enforceable 
claims on the revenue of Puerto Rico.219 On the other hand, 
Puerto Rico citizens impacted by the fiscal plan’s austerity 
measures may also have a claim based on the local 
 
218 Another example of Congress’s concern about the timing and 
efficiency of PROMESA proceedings is found in § 106(d): “It shall be the 
duty of the [courts] to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest 
possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under this Act.” 
PROMESA § 106(d), 48 U.S.C. § 2126(d) (2012). 
219 See supra Section II.E. This argument assumes that the plaintiffs’ 
liens and other constitutional and statutory rights are recognizable 
property interests that are protected from seizure without due process or 
proper compensation. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(1) and (b)(6) at 44–59, Assured Guar. Corp. v. Puerto Rico, 301 F. 
Supp. 3d 288 (D.P.R. 2017) (No. 17 BK 3283) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ 
Opposition Memo]. This Note also does not address the question of whether 
the fiscal plan violates substantive due process rights of creditors but 
focuses instead on claims of procedural due process violations. 
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government’s inability to issue certain welfare benefits.220 In 
many cases, these interests cannot be arbitrarily deprived 
without constitutionally adequate notice and the opportunity 
to be heard.221 
In order to establish such a violation, a party must show 
that: (1) it has a valid property interest, (2) the government is 
threatening to, or has in fact, deprived it of its interest, and 
(3) such a deprivation occurred without adequate opportunity 
to be heard.222 The first element, which considers whether 
creditors have a valid property interest or whether citizens 
have an interest in welfare benefits, can be a complex and 
widely contested issue; this Note does not delve into this 
complicated dispute, and therefore assumes that at least some 
 
220 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
221 Plaintiffs’ Opposition Memo, supra note 219, at 59; see also U.S. 
CONST. amends. V, XIV (prohibiting the federal and state governments from 
depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”). Puerto Rico’s status as a territory does not change the right to due 
process, even though the Fifth Amendment, on its face, applies to the federal 
government, and the Fourteenth Amendment, on its face, applies to states. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that it is “unnecessary to determine 
which Amendment applie[s] to Puerto Rico,” since “[t]he Joint Resolution of 
Congress approving the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
subjects its government to the applicable provisions of the Constitution of 
the United States,” and “there cannot exist under the American flag any 
governmental authority untrammeled by the requirements of due process 
of law[.]” Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668–69 
n.5 (1974) (internal quotations and citations omitted). As such, it is also not 
important to identify which entity (either Congress for enacting PROMESA 
and delegating powers to the FOMB, or the FOMB as a territorial entity 
under PROMESA § 101(c)(1)) would ultimately be responsible for the 
deprivation.  
Finally, it is important to note that a federal court could exercise 
jurisdiction over due process challenges pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.”). 
222 See Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly 
Liquidation Authority: Too Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 
204 (2014); see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
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relevant stakeholder could satisfy this first element.223 The 
Note instead explores the latter two issues. In particular, 
stakeholders challenging the fiscal plan process would first 
need to establish when, over the course of a PROMESA 
proceeding, deprivation of property has occurred; then, these 
stakeholders can proceed to the next issue of whether 
sufficient process was provided.224  
Section IV.A examines the unique structure of a 
PROMESA proceeding and considers when exactly a party’s 
property interest is deprived.225 Section IV.B then outlines the 
 
223 For more context on the creditor property interest argument, 
compare Motion to Dismiss Ambac, supra note 179, at 28–38 (addressing 
why creditors have not established property interests because they are not 
secured claimholders and do not hold property through contractual rights 
to be paid in advance of other stakeholders) with Plaintiffs’ Opposition 
Memo, supra note 219, at 45–58 (summarizing federal jurisprudence 
recognizing that constitutionally-protected property interests and first-
priority payments are property interests). 
224 See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) 
(“Only after finding the deprivation of a protected interest do we look to see 
if the . . . procedures comport with due process.”). 
225 Regarding due process claims, “the Supreme Court has tended to 
treat notice as a requirement distinct from other procedural elements.” 
Merrill & Merrill, supra note 222, at 205. For an example of this, see 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“Parties whose rights are to be 
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right 
they must first be notified.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
In this case, the FOMB has not only publicly released each iteration of 
the proposed fiscal plan but has also sent out general public statements 
notifying stakeholders of different stages of the review or certification 
process. See, e.g., Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., Invitation to 
Comment on the Government of Puerto Rico Fiscal Plan Presented on Oct. 
14, 2016 (Nov. 9, 2016) [hereinafter Invitation to Comment], 
https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/50/5824d1640f 
292.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DTQ-VSYR]. 
Given these details, it would seem that notice was in fact given in a 
reasonable manner such that creditors could find the information easily. See 
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 171 (2002) (noting “our cases 
have never required actual notice”); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank 
& Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (requiring that the notice “is in itself 
reasonably certain to inform those affected” and “where conditions do not 
reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less 
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various opportunities stakeholders have to contribute their 
thoughts and suggestions during the fiscal plan drafting and 
approval process. Section IV.C describes the procedural due 
process standard as laid out by the Supreme Court in 
Mathews v. Eldridge and applies that framework to the 
current situation in Puerto Rico to determine whether there 
is a due process violation.  
A. Final Deprivation of Property  
The Constitution requires only that parties have an 
opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of property.226 
In traditional bankruptcies, this occurs in court when 
creditors’ rights to debt payments are determined.227 
However, under PROMESA’s unique framework, the 
existence of a fiscal plan that precedes the Act’s analogous 
bankruptcy proceedings complicates this inquiry. Because the 
fiscal plan is a controlling document that allocates financial 
resources to various activities and functions of the local 
government, both the court and creditors are bound by its 
particular terms.228 This in turn also determines how much 
money is available for use in governmental functions, as the 
amount of money Puerto Rico’s government has is fixed.  
Therefore, it would seem that the determination of 
creditors’ right to debt repayment, and therefore the instance 
of deprivation for various stakeholders, is shifted from Title 
III, the reorganization stage of PROMESA, to the preceding 
fiscal plan certification stage. 
Title III of PROMESA was drafted to mirror the judicial 
proceedings in Chapter 9 for municipal bankruptcies and 
 
likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary 
substitutes.”) (internal citations omitted). 
226 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (prohibiting the federal and state 
governments from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”); see also Motion to Dismiss Assured Guaranty, supra 
note 179, at 39 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 
452 U.S. 264, 299 (1981)).  
227 See infra note 231. 
228 See PROMESA §§ 104(j), 314, 48 U.S.C. §§ 2124(j), 2174 (2012). 
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Chapter 11 for business bankruptcies.229 There is no question 
that deprivation of property rights occurs in typical 
bankruptcy cases230—an entity typically files for bankruptcy 
only when it is unable to meet its financial obligations in full, 
and the court provides a venue for debtors, creditors, and 
other stakeholders to negotiate a plan for proportionate debt 
repayment. However, traditional bankruptcies do not present 
procedural concerns despite the existence of property 
deprivation because stakeholders are usually afforded 
sufficient opportunity to be heard in court.231  
Under Title III, creditors are afforded many of the same 
procedural protections that can be found in traditional 
bankruptcy. For example, if a creditor disputes the terms of 
its debt recovery, it can ask a judge to “consider whether 
available remedies under the non-bankruptcy laws and 
constitution of the territory would result in a greater 
recovery[.]”232 Thus, Title III “provides ample protection to all 
interested parties,” and following that logic, the FOMB 
asserts that there can be no due process violations.233  
 
229 See AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 15. 
230 See, e.g., In re Golden, 16 B.R. 580, 585 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) 
(“There is a deprivation of property in any bankruptcy action whereby a 
creditor is not paid the entire amount of its claim.”). 
231 See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938) (“As the 
bankruptcy power may be exerted to give effect to a plan for the composition 
of the debts of an insolvent debtor, we find no merit in appellant's objections 
under the Fifth Amendment.”); see also U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY 
COURTS––BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS CASES COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF 
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE ONE-MONTH PERIOD ENDING JULY 31, 
2017, BASED ON DATA CURRENT AS OF SEPT. 30, 2017 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/bf_f2.1_0930.2017.p
df [https://perma.cc/QK7D-7DQ2] (showing over 450 Chapter 11 fillings 
over the month of July 2017, indicating that parties are not disputing 
whether regular bankruptcy proceedings violate procedural due process 
rights). 
232 PROMESA § 314. 
233 Motion to Dismiss Ambac, supra note 179, at 40–41. The FOMB 
cites Title III of PROMESA as incorporating “the relevant procedural 
framework of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.” Id.; see also PROMESA §§ 
301–317. 
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While the FOMB is correct in stating that Title III includes 
robust mechanisms for judicial process, review, and remedies, 
it makes a critical assumption that the deprivation of property 
in fact occurs during Title III proceedings. However, there is 
a strong argument that the deprivation actually occurs before 
Title III is initiated. The development of a fiscal plan precedes 
the resolution of debt through Title III, and thus that 
document in effect strictly limits the range of outcomes that 
can exist throughout the rest of the PROMESA proceedings.234 
As indicated in Section II.D, recent iterations of the fiscal plan 
have projected heavy losses for creditors and a severe 
reduction in government spending on important public 
services. Even if stakeholders took full advantage of the 
procedural mechanisms of Title III, the court cannot compel 
retroactive changes to the plan and its allocation of funds.  
As such, the actual deprivation in this case seems to occur 
not at the Title III stage, but rather when the terms of the 
fiscal plan are approved and certified by the FOMB. If this is 
the case, the remaining question then becomes whether the 
process afforded to stakeholders such as creditors and Puerto 
Rico constituents leading up to the plan’s certification meets 
the constitutional due process standard.  
B. FOMB Fiscal Plan Comment Process and Listening 
Sessions 
On October 14, 2016, then-Governor Alejandro García 
Padilla of Puerto Rico235 submitted the first draft of the fiscal 
plan to the FOMB.236 Several weeks later, on November 10, 
the FOMB released an “Invitation to Comment,” and both 
individuals and organizations could use a survey template to 
 
234 PROMESA § 314(b)(7). 
235 See Press Release, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., Oversight 
Board Publishes Written Comments on the Government of Puerto Rico’s 
Proposed Fiscal Plan (Dec. 8. 2016), https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-
content/uploads/wpfd/49/5849b89f0b032.pdf [https://perma.cc/A82C-
3WRS]. 
236 PROPOSED 2016 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 97. 
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record reactions, concerns, and feedback to the plan.237 In 
total, the comment period lasted thirteen days after the initial 
press release.238  
The FOMB then aggregated and published all of the 
commentary that was received.239 Notably, many respondents 
chose to discard the template format and submitted detailed, 
freeform written responses about their concerns with the 
plan.240 Some bondholders commented that because the fiscal 
plan elevated all other expenses over constitutional debt 
service, it was in direct violation of the Puerto Rico 
Constitution and Congress’s requirement that the plan 
respect lawful priorities.241 Other respondents pointed out 
 
237 See generally Invitation to Comment, supra note 225. This form 
could be submitted electronically to the FOMB through email. See id. 
238 Press Release, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., PROMESA 
Oversight Board Invites Individuals and Organizations to Provide Written 
Comments on the Government of Puerto Rico’s Proposed Fiscal Plan (Nov. 
10, 2016), https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/49/ 
5824dbae7d50a.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL69-YG79]; Press Release, Fin. 
Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., PROMESA Oversight Board Reminds the 
Public that Today Is the Deadline to Provide Written Comments on the 
Government of Puerto Rico’s Proposed Fiscal Plan (Nov. 23, 2016), 
https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/49/ 
5835dc8ba545e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CL2-CYAK]. 
239 FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. OF P.R., LOG OF RESPONSES TO PUBLIC 
CONSULTATION REQUEST, https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/wpfd/50/5849b4ee7abe2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KM6-K2DP]. Most 
notably, 50% of the respondents identified as Puerto Rico residents while 
only 2% identified as creditors and 18% requested their identity be kept 
confidential. The other respondents included Trade Associations (11%), 
Employees of Puerto Rico (2%), and “Other” (18%). Id.  
240 See, e.g., FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. OF P.R., PUBLIC COMMENTS TO 
GOVERNMENT OF PR FISCAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH PLAN - CATEGORY 
CREDITORS 16–19, https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
wpfd/50/5849b4d65d0c2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG8M-8QVJ]. 
241 FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. OF P.R., PUBLIC COMMENTS TO 
GOVERNMENT OF PR FISCAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH PLAN - CATEGORY 
OTHERS 12 [hereinafter OTHER COMMENTS TO FP], 
https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/50/5849b4eb 
7d711.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J4D-VCGT]. An ad hoc group of GO 
bondholders stated: 
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flaws or oversimplifications in the plan that exaggerated 
revenue figures or understated expenses.242 In total, 114 
responses were recorded and over four hundred pages of 
feedback was provided.  
As a result of its own analysis, the FOMB denied 
certification of the plan.243 The FOMB noted that Puerto Rico 
would likely face a deficit much larger than the one in the 
proposal,244 and requested that the governor rework the plan 
with new measures aimed at spurring economic growth and 
reducing the deficit.245 However, the FOMB did not cite or 
reference any of the feedback received during the comment 
process and failed to provide stakeholders with another 
opportunity to assess the numbers and details of the new plan. 
After several more rounds of iteration,246 the FOMB held 
an open meeting at which the governor presented his final 
plan to the FOMB and in that session, provided the public 
with an opportunity to comment.247 The FOMB issued its 
approval and certification of this final version of the fiscal plan 
 
 “The Board should not seriously entertain any Fiscal Plan 
premised on the notion of impairing Constitutional debt 
while paying other expenses in full. . . . The Commonwealth 
has instituted measures to continue making 
unconstitutional transfers to COFINA while not paying the 
Constitutional debt . . . . [and] [t]he Fiscal Plan takes 
billions of dollars that have been or will be ‘clawed back’ to 
pay Constitutional debt and instead uses those funds for 
other purposes.”  
Id. at 12–13; see also supra Section II.E. 
242 See, e.g., OTHER COMMENTS TO FP, supra note 241, at 31–45. 
(pointing out the fiscal plan ignores the impact major increase in electricity 
rates would have on the Puerto Rico economy). 
243 2016 Fiscal Plan Adjustment Letter, supra note 99. 
244 Id. These projections were calculated by the government’s own team 
of staff and advisors and were vetted by the FOMB and its advisors, as well 
as independent third-parties. Id. at 1–2. The FOMB calculated a deficit that 
was almost $10 billion larger. Id. at 1. 
245 Id. at 2.  
246 See supra Section II.D. 
247 See BOARD RESOLUTION, supra note 100.  
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in that same open meeting, and never initiated another multi-
day comment period for any other draft after the first one.248 
As described in Section II.D, the initial fiscal plan has since 
been abandoned, and the FOMB has ultimately drafted 
several new plans that claim to better reflect the current 
economic realities on the island. Since this process began, it 
does not appear that any additional comment period has been 
initiated. The FOMB did host three separate listening 
sessions for experts and stakeholders to present on topics of 
their choice, but these events occurred before a new plan was 
developed and released.249 There is also no indication that 
prior to the certifications in April 2018 and October 2018, 
there were any comment or review periods for stakeholders of 
interest.  
C. Mathews v. Eldridge: Procedural Due Process Test 
and Application  
The final step in the analysis is to consider whether the 
comment period and listening sessions that were made 
available to creditors and Puerto Rico citizens provided a 
sufficient opportunity to be heard. The general standard for 
determining procedural adequacy was defined by the 
Supreme Court in Mathews, which balances: (1) the private 
individual’s interests in retaining property and injury 
threatened by the action; (2) the risk of error through the 
procedures used and probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the costs and 
administrative burden of additional processes, and interests 
 
248 Press Release, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., Oversight 
Board Certifies Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/49/58c6e 
47508b7a.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVC4-MWGX]. 
249 See id.; see also Press Release, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 
Oversight Board to Hold Second Listening Session on Fiscal Measures (Nov. 
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of the government250 in efficient adjudication.251 Notably, this 
test does not consider whether the “totality of private interests 
outweigh the totality of government interests,” but instead 
“appears to contemplate a marginalist inquiry” into whether 
changing the existing procedures is worth the associated 
administrative burdens.252  
1. Stakeholder Interests 
Regarding the first prong, Puerto Rico’s creditors and 
investors have a clear economic interest in the bonds they 
hold.253 In aggregate, Puerto Rico’s creditors and pensioners 
are owed over $120 billion,254 with forty percent of the debt 
owed to Puerto Rico residents and twenty percent owed to 
hedge funds. 255 U.S. municipal bond funds hold $7.8 billion in 
Puerto Rico debt and U.S. mutual funds held about $8.4 
billion when the island first filed for PROMESA bankruptcy 
protection in May 2017.256 Similarly, major bond insurers, 
such as Assured Guaranty and Ambac, each hold close to $10 
billion in Puerto Rican debt.257 Nevertheless, while these 
 
250 In this case, the “government’s” interest is represented through the 
FOMB, as it is formally an entity within Puerto Rico, but functions as a 
representative of Puerto Rico’s interests. See PROMESA § 101(c)(1), 48 
U.S.C. § 2121(c)(1) (2012). 
251 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  
252 Merrill & Merrill, supra note 222, at 211. 
253 See William D. Cohan, Puerto Rico’s Human Catastrophe Is Hedge 
Funds’ Inhuman Nightmare, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/10/puerto-rico-hurricane-debt-
creditors [https://perma.cc/93V6-S6DC].  
254 APR. 2018 FISCAL PLAN, supra note 5, at 1.  
255 Nathan Bomey, ‘Wipe Out’ Puerto Rico Debt? Hedge Funds, 





257 See Cooper J. Howard, From Bad to Worse: An Update on Puerto 
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absolute figures are large, it is important to consider them in 
context. Many of the stakeholders with the largest financial 
exposures to Puerto Rican debt, such as bond insurers, are in 
the business of underwriting risk and are able to balance risk 
factors across an entire portfolio of holdings.258 Similarly, 
many of the institutional creditors that hold Puerto Rican 
bonds are sophisticated actors, and likely recognize that any 
investment carries with it a degree of risk.259 Therefore, while 
the magnitude of loss in this case is significant, it is not 
entirely clear what the impact might be on these large 
corporate investors and insurers. 
Institutional creditors are not the only ones with a 
significant interest in Puerto Rico’s insolvency. Of the 
territory’s debt, close to $50 billion relates to unfunded 
pension liabilities, which directly impact local citizens and 
their retirement savings.260 Perhaps even more concerning is 
the reality that Puerto Rico may not have enough funds to 
provide its citizens with effective governmental services.261 
2. Risk of Error and Additional Procedural 
 
258 For example, the Supreme Court has previously recognized that “[i]t 
is characteristic of insurance that a number of risks are accepted, some of 
which involve losses, and that such losses are spread over all the risks so as 
to enable the insurer to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible 
liability upon it.” Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 
205, 211 (1979) (internal quotations and citation omitted). As noted above, 
some of the stakeholders exposed in Puerto Rico are bond insurers. 
259 See generally J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. 
SECURITIES LAW § 4:9 (2017) (“[T]he general character of investment 
securities makes some of them inherently riskier than others. . . . For 
example, secured debt is less risky than unsecured debt and among 
unsecured debt obligations ‘junk bonds’ typically carry higher interest rates 
(which explains why these bonds are also called ‘high yield’) than other 
forms of unsecured debt.”). 
260 Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Declares a Form of Bankruptcy, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/ 
business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt.html [https://perma.cc/8X8A-VKJK]. 
261 Id. See generally Newkirk, supra note 70. 
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Safeguards 
The second prong of the test requires consideration of not 
only the risk of error that can occur under the current process 
available, but also the value of instituting additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards.262 One important factor to 
consider in this evaluation is the FOMB’s expertise and 
competency in evaluating the terms of a plan and assessing 
its short-term and long-term impacts. In a case involving 
medical reimbursements under Medicare, the Supreme Court 
assessed this prong of the Mathews test by considering 
whether the presiding officers in the appeals hearing were 
sufficiently knowledgeable to accurately adjudicate these 
claims.263 The Court found that these “hearing officials” were 
“qualified individual[s] with the ability to conduct formal 
hearings and with a general understanding of medical 
matters and terminology,” and had “a thorough knowledge of 
the Medicare program and the statutory authority and 
regulations upon which it is based[.]”264 As a result, the 
appellee’s right to due process was not violated because, 
according to the Court, the use of a different adjudicator or the 
introduction of additional procedures would not have reduced 
the risk of erroneous deprivation.265  
In this case, the main arbiter of the fiscal plan drafting 
process is the FOMB. The entity is composed of individuals 
who are submitted for consideration by members of Congress, 
appointed by the President, and have “knowledge and 
expertise in finance, municipal bond markets, management, 
law, or . . . government.”266 Additionally, the FOMB does not 
operate alone in finalizing the fiscal plan, as the governor and 
other local officials are usually involved.267 However, while 
diversity and depth of expertise is apparent here, creditors 
 
262 See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text. 
263 See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 199 (1982).  
264 Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
265 Id. at 200. 
266 PROMESA §§ 101(e)–(f), 48 U.S.C. §§ 2121(e)–(f) (2012). 
267 See supra Section II.D. 
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can take issue with the fact that the FOMB does not have a 
creditor representative, which might lead to blind spots in the 
decision-making process. Similarly, Puerto Rican citizens can 
argue that because all of the board members are nominated 
by the President, there is a lack of democratically-elected 
representatives that can advocate for issues facing average 
Puerto Rican citizens. 
Another factor to consider is that in the end, developing a 
fiscal plan is “not merely a mathematical exercise of balancing 
the checkbook,”268 but is rather a complicated process of 
balancing interests that pull in separate directions. In this 
situation, the concept of “erroneous” deprivation is 
misleading, as the FOMB is not responsible for making a 
straightforward positive or negative determination but is 
rather tasked with formulating a comprehensive recovery 
plan for an economically declining, insolvent territory. The 
FOMB has noted that any plan it approves “must strike the 
right balance between fiscal adjustment, structural reform 
and debt restructuring,” and also consider the “impact of 
potential changes on Puerto Rican [residents], as well as on 
institutional stakeholders and society at large.”269 
The Supreme Court has recognized that due process does 
not require that “the procedures used to guard against an 
erroneous deprivation . . . be so comprehensive as to preclude 
any possibility of error[.]”270 Rather, “the fundamental 
fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result 
obtained in any individual case,” but should be “shaped by the 
risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process[.]”271 
Therefore, it would be improper to focus squarely on either the 
creditor’s terms of recovery or the resources available for 
 
268 Press Release, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. of P.R., Oversight Board 
Addresses Larger Fiscal Deficit 2 (Dec. 20, 2016), https://juntasupervision. 
pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/49/58595509cff01.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9 
5K-R4A7]. 
269 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
270 Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320–21 
(1985) (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (internal 
quotations omitted)).  
271 Id. at 321 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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public services—the emphasis should be on whether the 
process that was afforded to the important stakeholders was 
vulnerable to flawed or imbalanced determinations.  
3. Government’s Interests and Burdens 
The third prong of the Mathews test requires an 
assessment of the government’s, and by association the 
FOMB’s, interests in this case.272 Here, those interests are not 
entirely irreconcilable with those of the creditors or local 
citizens.273 Since faith in the island’s creditworthiness will 
determine whether entities will be willing to lend money to 
Puerto Rico in the future, all parties share a common “urgent 
interest . . . in an accurate and just decision”274 regarding 
creditor debt resolution under the fiscal plan.275 After Puerto 
Rican debt issuers were initially downgraded to junk status,276 
the island found it prohibitively more expensive to fund itself 
as lenders would require higher interest rates to match the 
riskiness of loan payback.277 Combating this consequence in 
 
272 See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text. 
273 See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) 
(“The utility’s interests are not incompatible with affording the notice and 
procedure described above. Quite apart from its duty as a public service 
company, a utility—in its own business interests—may be expected to make 
all reasonable efforts to minimize billing errors and the resulting customer 
dissatisfaction and possible injury.”). 
274 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). 
275 Congress’s desire for Puerto Rico to regain access to the credit 
markets is reflected in PROMESA, as the FOMB can only be terminated if 
the government “has adequate access to short-term and long-term credit 
markets at reasonable rates” to meet its borrowing needs. PROMESA § 
209(1), 48 U.S.C. § 2149(1) (2012); see also COMM. REPORT ON H.R. 5278, 
supra note 8, at 3. 
276 See, e.g., Rating Action: Moody’s Downgrades $13 Billion of Puerto 
Rico Bonds, Revises Outlook to Negative from Developing, MOODY’S 
INVESTORS SERV. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.moodys.com/research/ 
Moodys-Downgrades-13-Billion-of-Puerto-Rico-Bonds-Revises-Outlook--
PR_903936797 [https://perma.cc/AAU6-BTAN]. 
277 See Mark DeCambre, Puerto Rico Has More Than $70 Billion in 
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the future remains an important interest for the FOMB and 
Puerto Rican officials. 
However, the need to build creditor confidence must be 
balanced with other broader interests. As of February 2019, 
Puerto Rico is still recovering from a series of devastating 
hurricanes and dedicating financial resources to rebuilding 
the island is likely going to take priority over things like 
payment to corporate investors.278 The FOMB also has a 
strong interest in diminishing administrative burdens and the 
cost of lengthened and more robust proceedings. Given the 
number of stakeholders affected by the fiscal plan, it would 
not be surprising if parties attempted to delay the process and 
make requests for pre-certification hearings after every new 
draft is introduced.279 However, the cost of operating the 
FOMB and hiring experts, lawyers, and advisors to assist with 
these PROMESA proceedings is already incredibly high.280 
Requiring the FOMB to introduce a host of supplementary 
hearings or lengthier comment periods will certainly add to 
the monetary costs of this process and create intractable 
delays, leaving both creditors and citizens in limbo. 
4. Balancing Interests and Administrative 
Burdens 
In this instance, creditors clearly have large financial 
interests in and significant exposures to Puerto Rico.281 
Investors are also heavily influenced by signals from the 
 
278 See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
279 See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (“Moreover, the 
incentive to delay arising from the availability of a presuspension hearing 
would generate a sharp increase in the number of hearings sought and 
therefore impose a substantial fiscal and administrative burden on the 
Commonwealth.”) (citation omitted); see also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 
114 (1977). 
280 Michelle Kaske & Jodi Xu Klein, Puerto Rico Finds Going Bust Isn’t 




281 See Howard, supra note 257. 
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territory and the market indicating when debt obligations are 
unpayable. When it was first announced that the island was 
going to default on upcoming interest payments, bond insurer 
Ambac, with a $10 billion exposure to the territory’s debt 
through its insurance business, saw its stock price fall almost 
thirty percent, “causing investors to sustain substantial 
losses.”282 Investors have also expressed concern that MBIA, 
another bond insurer with heavy exposure to Puerto Rico debt, 
may not “survive heavy losses” because the company was 
undercapitalized.283 While it is true that many of Puerto Rico’s 
bondholders, whether they are regular investors or bond 
insurers, are sophisticated actors who structure their 
businesses around managing and balancing risks in their 
investments,284 that does not diminish the fact that Puerto 
Rico’s situation is unprecedented in scope and size. As a 
result, many of these investors may not have the requisite 
financial resources to weather either the perception of, or 
actual, losses from neglected debt servicing.285  
While the FOMB shares an interest in trying to preserve 
creditor confidence so that Puerto Rico can once again gain 
access to credit markets in the future, the FOMB also has 
important counterbalancing interests. Most importantly, 
Puerto Rico has, for some time, been in “crisis mode” 
recovery.286 Therefore, a large consideration for the governor 
 
282 Amended Class Action Complaint at 6, Wilbush v. Ambac Fin. Grp., 
Inc., No. 16-cv-05076, 2016 WL 8259638 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2016). 
283 Matt Wirz, Bond Insurer MBIA Targeted by Short Sellers After 
Puerto Rico Hurricane, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/hedge-funds-target-mbia-after-puerto-rico-hurricane-1513852201 
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).  
284 See supra Section II.E. 
285 See Howard, supra note 257 (reporting that bond insurers National 
and Ambac have fifty-five percent and ninety-two percent, respectively, of 
their exposure to Puerto Rico debt with claims paying resources—
essentially meaning that neither company has enough money to meet their 
own obligations if Puerto Rico does not service any of their debt in the short-
term); see also supra Section II.D. 
286 Alayna Treene, The Puerto Rico Recovery, by the Numbers, AXIOS 
(Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.axios.com/the-puerto-rico-recovery-by-the-
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and the FOMB when drafting a viable fiscal plan is to account 
for the costs of providing necessary services to local citizens, 
government entities and programs, and recovery efforts. 
Second, the FOMB has several practical considerations 
related to procedural and administrative efficiency. In the 
past, delays and inaction caused the island to default on many 
of its debt payments, which further exacerbated its financial 
situation.287 The Supreme Court has recognized that “due 
process is not so rigid as to require that the significant 
interests in . . . economy must always be sacrificed.”288 This 
push and pull has come to define many of the disagreements 
that have surfaced during these PROMESA proceedings, and 
the FOMB should constantly be trying to strike the optimal 
balance between sufficient process and a reasonable pace of 
progress. 
Over these last several iterations of the fiscal plan, both 
creditors and the citizenry have been given only a limited 
opportunity to contribute feedback. While the FOMB received 
the governor’s first draft of a proposed fiscal plan in October 
2016, the public request for feedback was not released until 
early November, and thereafter, parties had only two weeks 
to read, digest, analyze, and formulate a response.289 At no 
point in time were the stakeholders given an opportunity to 
meet face-to-face with the FOMB to discuss the underlying 
assumptions. Creditors have also expressed concerns about a 
lack of transparency with regards to many of the calculations 
and figures that inform the terms of the fiscal plan.290  
Even when the FOMB chose to reject the first draft of the 
fiscal plan, it did not demonstrate that it had considered and 
attempted to address the core concerns of respondents 
gathered during the comment period. The adjustments that 




287 See supra Section II.A. 
288 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973) (emphasis added). 
289 See supra Section IV.B. 
290 See Joint Creditor Letter, supra note 150; Creditor Press Release 
supra note 16. 
  
No. 1:367] THE PERFECT STORM 431 
stem from the feedback received from outside stakeholders, 
but arose out of independent empirical projections completed 
by advisors.291 Therefore, it is not clear to what extent the 
FOMB truly considered the feedback of other 
commentators.292  
After this initial comment period, the FOMB continued to 
review the plan with the governor but did not offer another 
feedback period. During recent efforts to revise the fiscal plan 
after Hurricane Maria, the FOMB offered three separate 
“listening sessions” for any interested stakeholders to 
participate.293 However, before the April 2018 fiscal plan was 
approved, it is clear that despite communications between the 
FOMB and the governor, other stakeholders were not 
included in the conversation.294 
If stakeholders were provided with a more substantial 
opportunity to meet with the governor and FOMB, they may 
have been able to help better communicate their interests in 
the broader scope of Puerto Rico’s insolvency problem. This 
would also perhaps help to alleviate some of the aggravation 
facing creditors who were denied their debt claims without a 
full explanation or demonstrated effort to collaborate295 and 
 
291 See generally Joint Creditor Letter, supra note 150. 
292 See generally id. 
293 See Second Listening Session Release, supra note 249. 
294 See Assured Guar., supra note 16 (commenting that 
“[u]nfortunately, the [FOMB] again formulated a fiscal plan without 
appropriate transparency of information and assumptions, and without 
collaboration with creditors.”). 
295 For example, in early 2017, the governor of Puerto Rico and the 
creditors of PREPA (possessing around $9 billion in debt) negotiated for 
months on a specific deal that would see creditors take a fifteen percent loss 
on their securities and wait longer to get repaid. See Michelle Kaske, Puerto 




  These terms are far superior, from a creditor’s perspective, to the severe 
haircut under the current fiscal plan. It also helped to foster goodwill 
between the two sides, as it demonstrated that the government was open 
and willing to compromise where possible. However, the FOMB voted 
against certifying the agreement due to concerns about the deal’s ability to 
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some of the tension that has led to violent protests that have 
roiled San Juan, the Puerto Rican capital.296 Comment periods 
and listening sessions are limited in their ability to provide 
parties of all interests a venue to hear each other and 
establish a better mutual understanding.297 
However, a core question embedded in the due process 
analysis is whether offering incremental processes, on top of 
those currently available, would better safeguard creditors’ 
interests, and, therefore, improve their final outcome.298 In 
this case, there are three reasons why additional comment 
periods or in-person meetings may not make a substantial 
difference to the creditors’ final outcome.  
First, Puerto Rico’s pie of financial resources is generally 
fixed. Especially after the devastation of Hurricane Maria, the 
island is hemorrhaging money as it seeks to rebuild basic 
infrastructure, businesses, and homes. The reality, therefore, 
is that even if all the stakeholders could come together, it is 
not clear what “concessions” the FOMB can make to serve 
creditor interests without simultaneously hurting the 
interests of local citizens.  
Second, many of the concerns that creditors in particular 
have raised since the first fiscal plan are conceptually very 
similar. Creditors such as GO and COFINA bondholders 
 
lower electricity rates and modernize the system. Id. These negotiations 
also took place early in the process, and after Hurricane Maria, it is unclear 
whether the government would be as willing to give creditors such terms on 
a deal simply for the reason that there may not be enough monetary 
resources, given the cost of the recovery efforts, for this to be viable. 
296 See Patricia Mazzei, Protest in Puerto Rico Over Austerity Measures 
Ends in Tear Gas, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/05/01/us/puerto-rico-protests.html [https://perma.cc/JFK2-8MTM]. 
297 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court noted that “written 
submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not 
permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker 
appears to regard as important,” and therefore in some cases, “written 
submissions [can be] a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.” 397 U.S. 
254, 269 (1970). In this case, the debt structure and balancing of creditor 
claims with regular government expenses and existing recovery efforts is all 
incredibly complex and could benefit from interactions beyond those of 
written submissions. See supra Section II.E. 
298 See Merrill & Merrill, supra note 222, at 211.  
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fundamentally disagree with the FOMB’s attempt to 
discharge other expenses over servicing public debt, as 
required by the Constitution of Puerto Rico.299 Creditors have 
also raised, on frequent occasion, concerns that the FOMB has 
not been transparent about the assumptions and projections 
that underlie its complex analysis. Therefore, it may be 
redundant and unproductive to allocate individual comment 
periods or schedule listening sessions and in-person meetings 
to discuss the same variation of issues at every stage of the 
process.  
Finally, there is evidence that creditors may not even have 
to depend on the FOMB and its formal PROMESA processes 
to voice their objections and influence the terms of a proposed 
fiscal plan. As described in Section IV.B, while the comment 
period offered by the FOMB allowed interested stakeholders 
to submit their thoughts in writing, a large majority of 
respondents chose to disregard the template provided and 
instead submitted their own lengthy commentary in whatever 
form they believed appropriate. Many of the core groups of 
creditors have also utilized their own platforms to release 
similar types of written feedback through direct letters and 
press releases that comment on flaws in the proposed fiscal 
plans. For example, a group of GO bondholders, COFINA 
bondholders, and several large bond insurers released a long 
letter to the board describing, in detail, concerns each class of 
creditors had regarding the substance and transparency of the 
plan.300 More recently, a collection of some of the same 
creditors released critical statements about the fiscal plan 
drafts prepared post-Hurricane Maria.301 Thus, it is not clear 
how institutional creditors are deprived of an opportunity to 
 
299 See Joint Creditor Letter, supra note 150. 
300 See id. 
301 Creditor Press Release, supra note 16; see also Press Release, 
Assured Guar., Assured Guaranty Responds to Puerto Rico’s Revised Fiscal 
Plan Proposals (Jan. 25, 2018) [hereinafter Assured Guaranty Press 
Release], http://assuredguaranty.newshq.businesswire.com/press-
release/assured-guaranty-responds-puerto-ricos-revised-fiscal-plan-
proposals [https://perma.cc/M37K-YDS9]. For more information on the 
contents of this press release, see infra note 323. 
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be heard when they have already demonstrated the 
willingness and ability to publicly offer their (often 
unsolicited) thoughts and criticisms. Similarly, some citizens 
have taken to the streets to voice their frustration and 
disagreement with the territory’s current state.302 
For these reasons, a court would likely find that there is no 
due process violation. Current evidence indicates that despite 
the strong interests of various stakeholders and the limited 
feedback processes that have been made available, both 
creditors and Puerto Rican citizens have still been able to find 
other ways to contribute to the broader discussion about the 
fiscal plans and financial path of the island. Requiring the 
FOMB to introduce a host of supplementary processes will 
create greater monetary and tactical delays without any clear 
benefits for the government or other interested parties. 
V. CONGRESSIONAL ASSESSMENT AND ACTION 
Despite the fact that stakeholders may not be successful in 
court, Congress can still play an important and useful role in 
safeguarding certain interests, especially given the broader, 
long-term goal of helping to repair Puerto Rico solvency and 
of ultimately regaining access to credit markets. 
While the FOMB holds direct power to shape the fiscal 
plan certification process, it is still a statutory entity with 
powers purely delegated through legislation. Thus, the FOMB 
is still subject to the political scrutiny of the federal 
government, and Congress has the ultimate authority to 
monitor and amend PROMESA in response to changing 
circumstances. Congress clearly has a vested interest in the 
proper interpretation and enactment of its laws and there is 
evidence to indicate that at least some members of Congress 
have begun to question whether the FOMB is deviating from 
its allocated responsibilities and ultimate goal.  
In June 2017, U.S. Senators Thom Tillis and Tom Cotton 
contacted the FOMB and expressed concern that the first 
certified fiscal plan violated the spirit and text of 
 
302 Mazzei, supra note 296. 
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PROMESA.303 In particular, the letter stated that “[m]ultiple 
creditor groups have asserted that the [FOMB has] not 
attempted to negotiate with bondholders . . . and in fact [has] 
failed to respond to creditors’ attempts to initiate 
negotiations.”304 Some of the substantive concerns raised in 
the letter included the “[p]lan’s failure to comply with lawful 
. . . liens,” “elevation of all non-debt spending above debt 
service,” and “unexplained economic assumptions” that drive 
Puerto Rico’s fiscal projections over the next several years.305 
However, that certified fiscal plan has since been 
abandoned,306 and recent proposals of updated plans indicate 
 
303 See Press Release, Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator, Cotton Seeks 
Additional Answers from the Financial Oversight and Management Board 
for Puerto Rico (June 13, 2017), https://www.cotton.senate. 
gov/?p=press_release&id=708 [https://perma.cc/YT6D-VP5G]; Letter from 
Senator Tillis & Senator Cotton, supra note 210; see also Letter from Tom 
Cotton, U.S. Senator, to Jose B. Carrion III, Chairman, Fin. Oversight & 
Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., https://www.cotton.senate.gov/files/documents/ 
170613PROMESALettertoCarrion.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2FD-4ZZA] 
[hereinafter Letter from Senator Cotton] (stating that the FOMB’s response 
letter to the April 7th letter was “vague and unresponsive,” and requesting 
that additional insight be provided as to why the FOMB believes that the 
current fiscal plan properly “respect the relative lawful priorities or lawful 
liens” as required by § 201(b)(1)(N)). To see the FOMB’s response letter, see 
Letter from José B. Carrión, Chair, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., to 
Thom Tillis, U.S. Senator, & Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/wp-content/uploads/wpfd/50/58ffadd 
569e07.pdf [https://perma.cc/GEF3-T7D4]. 
304 Letter from Senator Tillis & Senator Cotton, supra note 210. 
305 See id. Senator Cotton cited that investors stood to lose billions of 
dollars “as a result of the Board’s bizarre interpretation” of PROMESA’s 
requirements, which not only jeopardizes the retirement savings of many 
constituents in Puerto Rico and on the mainland, but also “creates a 
dangerous precedent that property and investor rights are open to 
interpretation in a fiscal crisis, which could badly destabilize the municipal 
bond market.” Letter from Senator Cotton, supra note 303. Senator Tom 
Cotton also made a follow-up statement: “If this is what ‘respecting’ legal 
obligations means [under PROMESA § 201(b)(1)(N)], what would 
‘disrespecting’ them look like?” Id. 
306 Heather Gillers & Andrew Scurria, Puerto Rico Faces Restart on 
Financial Plan After Maria, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-rico-had-a-financial-plan-before-
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that previously projected budget surpluses are now projected 
to be steep budget shortfalls.307 In reaction to these new terms, 
Rob Bishop, then-chairman of the House Natural Resources 
Committee,308 commented that while “[t]hese plans are a first 
step in Puerto Rico’s future recovery . . . [i]t is imperative the 
Oversight Board and Governor fully integrate those who hold 
the debt into the development of these plans, thereby 
guaranteeing accuracy and transparency in the underlying 
assumptions.”309 Reiterating that “the Board’s stated goal 
under PROMESA is to return Puerto Rico to fiscal 
accountability and the capital markets, and this can only 
occur if the fiscal plans respect the lawful priorities and liens 
of debt holders[,]” Representative Bishop remarked that his 
Committee “will be following the development of these plans 
intently to ensure financial stability and success return to the 
island.”310 Two months later, Representative Bishop once 
again expressed to the FOMB that there was frustration with 
“the [FOMB’s] inability and unwillingness to reach 
consensual restructuring agreements with the holders of 
Puerto Rico’s debt,” noting that “[t]o date, the Committee [on 
Natural Resources] has been unsatisfied with the 
implementation of PROMESA, and the lack of respect for the 
Congressional requirements of the Fiscal Plan.”311 
 
hurricane-maria-now-it-may-have-to-start-over-1506457739 (on file with 
the Columbia Business Law Review). 
307 Michelle Kaske & Yalixa Rivera, Puerto Rico Plan Leaves Almost No 
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In January 2019, the Democratic Party took control of the 
House. Representative Grijalva, the new chairman of the 
House Natural Resources Committee, has since stated that he 
plans to use the committee’s authority to begin probing into 
the situation in Puerto Rico, including assessing allegations of 
the FOMB’s conflicts of interest and pending proposals for 
paying back existing Puerto Rico creditors.312 While 
Representative Grijalva appears to disagree with the FOMB’s 
decisions to institute austerity measures to pay back creditors 
in the first instance,313 the notion that committee leadership 
is taking a closer look at all of the decisions being made in 
Puerto Rico’s insolvency is a good first step to improving upon 
the existing PROMESA mechanics as laid out in the 
legislative text and as seen in practice.314  
Members of Congress have not been the only government 
actors to express concern over the FOMB’s courses of action. 
In a ruling regarding the FOMB’s attempt to install a new 
head officer of Puerto Rico’s power and electricity utility,315 
U.S. District Court Judge Laura Swain316 articulated 
 
312 See Jeff Stein, Democrats Pledge to Use New House Majority to 





313 See id.  
314 See Mary Williams Walsh, Transparency of Puerto Rico Bankruptcy 
Is the Aim of a New Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/business/puerto-rico-bankruptcy-
promesa-mckinsey.html [https://perma.cc/8KJV-RRSB] (discussing new 
bipartisan bill to strengthen reporting requirements in Puerto Rico’s 
bankruptcy proceedings; sponsors include Republican Rep. Bishop, the 
former chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee and Jenniffer 
González-Colón, the Republican who represents Puerto Rico as a nonvoting 
member). 
315 For further details on this suit, see supra note 20 and accompanying 
text.  
316 Judge Swain was nominated by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. 
to preside over Puerto Rico’s PROMESA bankruptcy proceedings. Matthew 
Goldstein, Judge in Puerto Rico’s Debt Lawsuit Handled Major Financial 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/ 
  
438 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
discomfort with the FOMB’s claims of possessing such broad 
and exclusive powers. The FOMB had asserted that 
PROMESA bestowed “quintessential managerial, business, 
and executive” powers to the entity,317 allowing it to “direct 
any activities incidental to the execution of certified fiscal 
plans, approved budgets and, ultimately, a plan of 
adjustment,” including replacing existing government 
officials with its own selection.318 However, Judge Swain held 
that even though “Congress created a PROMESA Oversight 
Board with significant leverage in the form of guidance, 
gatekeeping, and enabling powers that would in essence 
provide guardrails for the territorial government on its 
journey to fiscal credibility and responsibility,” the FOMB’s 
powers are not without limitations.319 Judge Swain contrasted 
“[t]he degree of unilateral power that Congress has granted to 
the FOMB”320 with that granted to the District of Columbia 
Financial Control Board (the “D.C. Board”) in 1995321 to 
resolve D.C.’s fiscal deficit problems at the time. While the 
D.C. Board was empowered to “essentially declare 
significantly inconsistent legislative acts null and void 
 
05/business/dealbook/judge-puerto-rico-case.html (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review); see also PROMESA § 308, 48 U.S.C. § 
2168 (2012) (“[T]he Chief Justice of the United States shall designate a 
district court judge to sit by designation to conduct the case.”). 
317 Op. & Order Denying Urgent Motion of FOMB to Confirm 
Appointment of a Chief Transformation Officer at 8, In re Fin. Oversight & 
Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 583 B.R. 626 (D.P.R. 2017) (No. 17-3283) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
318 Id.  
319 Id. at 14. 
320 Id. at 13.  
321 PROMESA’s analogue during the D.C. fiscal crisis was the District 
of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 
1995. See id. For more information regarding the D.C. fiscal crisis and the 
D.C. fiscal board, see Michael Janofsky, Congress Creates Board to Oversee 
Washington, D.C., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1995/04/08/us/congress-creates-board-to-oversee-washington-dc.html (on 
file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
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unilaterally,” Congress declined to include such a provision in 
PROMESA.322  
Given the complicated issues at stake in Puerto Rico’s 
insolvency, Congress has a significant interest in conducting 
a more comprehensive reassessment as to whether the 
current PROMESA proceedings do, in fact, adhere not only to 
the explicit provisions of the law, but also to the spirit and 
eventual goal of Puerto Rico’s restructuring efforts. In 
particular, it is important to understand whether the FOMB 
has achieved the right balance between efficiency of process 
and protection of stakeholder interests. One of the main long-
term aims for Puerto Rico and the FOMB is to rebuild investor 
confidence. For better or for worse, accomplishing this goal 
depends on stakeholder perception that the island is 
competent at handling the complex web of stakeholder 
interests. Much of the controversy around the FOMB’s 
attempts to certify a fiscal plan stems from the fact that there 
is little transparency, and this is especially problematic given 
that many of the major creditors believe they have strong, 
inalienable guarantees that should not be wholly ignored 
without real explanation or justification.323  
Given new House leadership and increased congressional 
efforts to better understand how the Puerto Rico bankruptcy 
 
322 Op. & Order Denying Urgent Motion of FOMB to Confirm 
Appointment of a Chief Transformation Officer at 13, In re Fin. Oversight 
& Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 583 B.R. 626 (No. 17-3283); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
114-602, pt. 1, at 111 (2016) (“[PROMESA] establishes a board that is robust 
but reasonable. Its powers are far less potent than the powers that Congress 
conferred upon the board that it established for the District of Columbia[.]”). 
323 Dominic Frederico, President and CEO of Assured Guaranty, 
commented that “the Revised Fiscal Plans repeat and exacerbate flaws in 
the original plans,” and “[t]his disregard for creditors’ rights would shake, 
on a nationwide basis, investors’ confidence in the enforceability of their 
contracts, the rule of law and public officials’ willingness to abide by the 
commitments they have made,” ultimately making it “more expensive for 
municipalities throughout the United States to fund essential services and 
infrastructure for their taxpayers.” Assured Guaranty Press Release, supra 
note 301. He believes that collaboration between all stakeholders “would be 
a far better solution than certifying a non-collaborative five-year plan in 
which no one can have confidence because its assumptions and development 
are secretive.” Id.  
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is unfolding,324 both creditors and affected citizens may have 
a chance to join the political conversation and raise their 
concerns outside of the judicial process. Although 
congressional Democrats have signaled discomfort with 
paying back creditors, as doing so would have a significant 
impact on the territory’s ability to fund itself in other 
important areas,325 Puerto Rico also has a long-term interest 
in preserving its ability to borrow in the future, and this is 
something that the new Democratic leaders should keep in 
mind.  
Each interaction between the FOMB and creditors will 
either lay an important foundation of confidence in the 
island’s future financial integrity or sow seeds of skepticism 
regarding Puerto Rico’s willingness to honor its obligations. 
Given what is at stake, Congress has the responsibility to 
provide ultimate supervision of these PROMESA proceedings 
and ensure that the island resolves its financial problems 
while simultaneously optimizing goals on other fronts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Puerto Rico is at a historic legal and financial crossroads. 
The island is buried under an unprecedented amount of 
outstanding debt,326 and many of its core debt guarantees 
seem fundamentally incompatible.327 On top of these dire 
financial problems, Puerto Rico has had to grapple with 
unparalleled damage and destruction brought by Hurricane 
Irma and Hurricane Maria.328 PROMESA, the legislative 
solution that Congress specifically designed to help the 
territory address its myriad of problems,329 is a novel 
bankruptcy scheme and remains largely untested. The 
 
324 See supra notes 312, 314.  
325 See, e.g., Letter from Members of Cong. & U.S. Senators to Members 
of the Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.puertoricoreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Bicameral-
letter-to-FOMB.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FPY-XLS9]. 
326 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra Section II.E.  
328 See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. 
329 See supra Section II.C. 
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situation in Puerto Rico will set an important precedent, not 
only as an example of how to resolve territorial bankruptcies 
outside of the traditional bankruptcy code,330 but also as 
another test case that adds to the universe of experience 
regarding municipal bond crises and creditor confidence.  
From a legal perspective, stakeholders have several 
avenues by which to challenge the direction of these current 
proceedings, and two of these theories are presented and 
analyzed in this Note. Ultimately, a close examination of these 
legal issues indicates that neither PROMESA nor a theory of 
procedural due process violation will give creditors the 
recourse to invalidate a certified fiscal plan. These limitations 
are created both by the textual construction of the existing law 
and by the unique circumstances of opportunity and process 
offered by the FOMB.  
In light of these conclusions, stakeholders may find more 
success in appealing to Congress and to the broader interests 
at stake here. Having an obscured and unilateral PROMESA 
process is not going to solve the larger problems that caused 
Puerto Rico’s situation in the first place. Ultimately, it will 
make financial recovery and habitation on the island even 
more difficult in the future. Therefore, the onus rests on the 
federal legislative branch to evaluate the effectiveness of 
PROMESA, the decisions of the FOMB, and the direction 
Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy situation. And if Congress believes 
it is necessary, requisite changes must be made to steer the 
entire process onto a new path. 
 
 
330 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
